'PRINCIPAL DESPATCHES AND CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO PERSIA CONNECTED WITH THE SUMMARY OF EVENTS AND MEASURES OF VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDDLESTON IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. JANUARY 1899 TO NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV-PART IV. PERSIA.' [‎7v] (19/136)

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p or convenience snliej tliongh I trust tlie v\liole memortinclum "will Ije
considered, I will liere quote the penulti-
Paragraph 29. mate paragraph, which sums up my views
and proposals. It ran as follows :
cs Persia is misgoverned and her condition is not satisfactory. Her finances
are in disorder, ancf her resources undeveloped, and she contains some elements
of disturbance,’ while there is no armed force upon which the Government can
depend for the maintenance of its authority. The influence _ of Russia, which
is antagonistic to our own, predominates at Tehran, and it is believed to be
exerted against the interests of the country.
“ On the other hand, Persia has practically no debt, and her natural
resources are great. Her internal condition is not hopeless, or such as to cause
immediate alarm. And the influence of Russia, th ugh predominant, is not
exclusive. Russia has still a strong position throughout the country, and
Russia, recognising her own weakness in Asia, seems unlikely for the piesent to
take any step in Persia which would seriously offend us.
“The general situation, therefore, might be worse, but it is not one with
which we can rest altogether satisfied.
“ It is not probable that Prussia will combine with England in reorganising
the Persian administration and in developing her trade; and there is little help
to be got in this direction from other European nations, none of w r hom carry any
weight in Tehran.
“ England by herself, especially if thwarted by Russia, cannot hope to
overcome the opposition of interested persons in high places, and to carry a
scheme of reform which shall regenerate Persia. She can hardly hope, indeed,
to carry any reform of radical importance, and must fall back upon her exist
ing policy, contenting herself with maintaining the integrity of Persia; watch
ing and checking Russian aggression; gaining the good-will, respect and
confidence of the Persian Government and people; developing trade; and
taking such opportunities as may occur of urging measures beneficial to the
country.
“ With a view to maintaining the integrity and independence of Persia,
it is desirable to make timely arrangements for securing a quiet succession on the
Shah’s death, and we should endeavour to strengthen our influence over the
heir-apparent by keeping an English with him, by improving the position of
our representative at Tabriz, and in other ways. "We should let it be understood
that aggressive action by Russia in the north of Persia will immediately result
in decided action by us in the south.
“ In order to strengthen the friendly feelings entertained towards us in
many parts of the country, we should encourage picked officers to travel among
the Chiefs and people, and we should, as occasion offers, establish fresh agencies
at important points. We should try to obtain for the people such benefits as
a good currency.
“ The Persian Government should be made to understand that they must
not trifle with us in the future, as they have occasionally done in the past;
but we should try to gain their good-will, and to help them in any way we can.
Just now there is an opportunity of putting them under a great obligation by
relieving them to some extent of the burden of the Regie Debt, which they
find very harassing. The Shah has begged us earnestly to help him in this
way, and has at the same time formally asked our advice as to the reforms
which should be made in his administration. I think we should give this advice
to the best of our power, and should clear off the Regie Debt by lending the
Persian Government half a million at 3 or I per cent on approved security
and on certain defined conditions. These conditions should include advantages
to our trade, such as the opening of the Upper Karun, and also a satisfactory
guarantee that the revenue and expenditure of the Persian Government shall,
for the future, be made to balance.