'PRINCIPAL DESPATCHES AND CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO PERSIA CONNECTED WITH THE SUMMARY OF EVENTS AND MEASURES OF VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDDLESTON IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. JANUARY 1899 TO NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV-PART IV. PERSIA.' [‎27v] (59/136)

for a corresponding British move in the south would, it can scarcely he doubted,
operate as a deterrent upon any premature activity on the part of Russia, since
she might thereby gravely jeopardise the realisation of her own dreams of
ultimate access to Southern Persia and the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. .
55. Nevertheless before we recommend that such a policy should be
essayed, we desire to raise the question whether, though it be impossible to
conclude an agreement with Russia for the joint patronage and development
of Persia, it might not yet be possible to come to an understanding with her
for the separate patronage and development of that country in distinct and clearly
defined compartments by the two great Powers, in other words for a recognition
of British and Russian spheres of interest in the dominions of _ the Shah. . This
is a solution the desirability of which has not been lost sight of by Sir M.
Durand, but which for certain reasons he did not feel called upon to discuss.
Recent events in China have familiarised the public mind with the idea of such
spheres of interest, although their existence would appear to be still somewhat
lacking both in clearness of definition and in precision of outline. The Viceroy
has observed in recent telegrams from Lord Salisbury to Sir M. Durand
Avith reference to a Persian loan and to mining concessions in that country,
indications of a willingness to concede to Russia liberties in the north of Persia,
parallel in scope and substance with those conceded to Great Britain in the
south; and it is worthy of consideration whether in an expansion of this
suggestion might not be found a feasible scheme.
56. We have already alluded to the line across Persia drawn by Sir M. Durand
from Khanikin on the Turkish frontier, through Kermanshah, Hamadan, Ispahan,
Yezd, and Kerman to Seistan, as indicating the northern limits of the sphere
within which British political influence and trade are paramount. To some extent
this partition is assisted by geographical conditions, the great deserts of Central
Persia constituting a natural barrier between the north and the south, and
roughly dividing the one from the other. But this situation is modi fled both
in the west of Persia, where there are no deserts, and where there is no
physical line of demarcation between the respective spheres of influence;
in the centre of Persia, where Ispahan can hardly be said to constitute the
natural frontier of any geographical zone; and also in the extreme east where
Seistan, the inclusion of which in the British sphere would be an obligatory
point, lies not to the south but to the north of the great desert. These con
siderations might not affect the success of any engagement that was carried out
with equal bonaJides by both parties: but they might become a fruitful source
of friction were such a good understanding not to be counted upon in the
future. In any case, we would recommend that the line of partition, suggested
by Sir M. Durand, should be. so far amended as to substitute Kashan for
Ispahan. It would, be undesirable that any Russian railway should penetrate
further south than Kashan, which indeed is separated by a considerable range
of hills from Ispahan, or that Russia should have right of access to the very
fringe of the latter district.
57. We have observed that in China the Agreement recently concluded
between Her Majesty’s Government and Russia as to spheres of interest has
related to railways only. Either party has pledged itself not to seek on
its own account or on behalf of others for railway concessions in the rival
sphere,. and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for such
concessions, supported by the other in that sphere. JPrinia facie there does not
appear to be any reason Avhy such an agreement should not equally be extended
to mines, roads, and other industrial or economic undertakings. The value
of such an understanding is considerable; because although political influence
is not expressly mentioned, yet in eastern countiies commercial and industrial
enterprises are the familiar agencies through which political influence is exercised
y alien powers, and because that influence is apt to follorv in the w r ake of
railw ays and irade. We do not think, if such an agreement w T ere arrived at with
Russia, with reference to the Persian territories lying north and south of the
pi c (ica e fme, that there wuuld be an end to Russian designs in Southern
ersia or in the 1 ersian Gulf. Such a result might, perhaps, ensue from an
engagement that no political influence should be exercised by either party