'PRINCIPAL DESPATCHES AND CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO PERSIA CONNECTED WITH THE SUMMARY OF EVENTS AND MEASURES OF VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDDLESTON IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. JANUARY 1899 TO NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV-PART IV. PERSIA.' [‎39v] (83/136)

Protection of British interests in Persia.
region. I desire therefore to receive Your Excellency’s observations upon the
correspondence now enclosed.
5. I pass on to the careful and exhaustive review contained in your letter of
the 21st of September, relative to the present situation in Persia, and the course
of British relations with it. The most vital interests of the Government of
India in that country concern the defence of ^ the Indian Empire against any
attack proceeding from the borders of Baluchistan or Southern Peisia, and
from the ports in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . But any measuies which may be sug
gested for meeting or averting that risk must take into account the resistance
which they are likely to encounter from foreign Powders, whose own interests
in Persia and in the Gulf have been greatly extended in recent years. It is in
this respect that the situation has undergone a material change of late.
6. As regards Russia, her advance on the borders of Persia and her assimi
lation of the territory absorbed by her in Central Asia, have ensured to her a
safe stepping stone for a fresh move. Our base of operations remains on the
sea while Russia has moved, and as she has advanced her influence has in
creased. If we lay down the principle of the independence of Persia, we are
met by the fact that Russia has already gained on land a position which domi
nates and threatens almost the whole of Persia, and enables her under cover
of concessions and monopolies, to exercise a practical and exclusive control
over a considerable proportion of the administration of the country. The very
independanoc which we struggle to maintain may become the most effective
instrument which Russia can use against us. Already our influence in
Northern Persia has yielded to the pressure of Russia, who could annex
that part of Persia without our being able to offer any effective resistance.
7. Your Excellency is also aware of the course of events in the Gulf,
which have already modified that theory of “ unchallenged supremacy both
naval and commercial” to which you refer in paragraph 12 of your letter under
reply. Prance has resolutely asserted her right to a joint protectorate over
Maskat with all the consequences that may flow from the guarantee of 1862.
Germany is interested in the development of railway enterprise, and her agents
have lately proceeded to Koweit. Russian ships have visited Bunder A.bbas and
adjoining islands, as well as other ports in the Gulf. In these and various
other ways the unquestioned position, which was formerly asserted and exercised
by us, has, even in the Gulf itself, been encroached upon. Though we still
possess a practical monopoly of trade in the Gulf, signs are nor wanting that
this advantage will be gradually challenged, partly by the extension of railways
to the sea and partly by the greater activity of foreign trade. It can hardly be
maintained that, in view of such a competition, civilized Powers can be perma
nently denied the benefit of access to the ports of Persia, because their admis
sion will infringe upon a monopoly which we have hitherto enjoyed.
8. But these changes, which are the inevitable consequence of improved
facilities both of internal communication and sea transport, render it the more
necessary that we should closely watch over the objects and aims of our past
policy in Persia, so that under the changing circumstances of the future we
may effectively safeguard those interests and spheres of influence in Persia which
are essential to India. Your Excellency discusses the possibility of coming to
an agreement with Russia as to the spheres of influence to be exercised respect
ively in Persia by the two countries. There is much to be said in favour of
such understanding, if it could be established and maintained. But the proba
bility is, that if any such overtures were made by Her Majesty’s Government
to the Russian Foreign Office, the Shah would be informed of the proposal ip
such a manner as possibly to convey to bis mind the idea that the partition
of his territories between Great Britain and Russia was the immediate object
of the present policy of Great Britain. For these and other reasons I see no
advantage at present in making any such proposals to the Russian Government,
or in making any fresh announcement to the Shah’s Government on the subject
of our settled and declared policy in Southern Persia* Wp have, at the present