Miscellaneous correspondence, reports, maps and other papers concerning the Middle East [‎77v] (155/220)

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^■ n ^ e sopotamia the Blockade problem presented peculiar difficulties, in
that it was always an important part of our policy to enlist the sympathy of
the Arabs in our cause. It was therefore always considered important to
extend to them all reasonable facilities for providing themselves with the
necessaries of life, while ensuring that those necessaries should not reach the
enemy, - but the Arabs themselves, by failing to reciprocate in the spirit in
v nch we met them, rendered it incumbent on the British authorities to devise
measures for the strict enforcement of the blockade.
The difficulties experienced in the Occupied Territories of Iraq need not
e considered here. Suffice it to say that in the light of experience a fairly
ettective scheme of blockade was evolved, the effect of which on the enemy
became daily more apparent.
For the complete success of the Iraq scheme however—involving, as it
clnt, a rigorous blockade of the northern part of the Arabian peninsula bv
tlie establishment of a cordon along the Euphrates line—it was essential that
no leakage of supplies should occur through neighbouring neutral or friendly
countries not under our control, and in this connection Eastern and Central
Arabia with its inlets on the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. coast had long been an obi'ect of
anxious consideration. J
It was obviously absurd to expect uncontrolled Arabs—whether Badawin
01 llacihr not to take advantage of the enormous profits to be made by meet
ing the enemy s demands for supplies. At the same time it was out" of the
question to adopt the simple expedient of blockading the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. ports
enemips a T] 11186 W0llld , ha J e . involved our friends in the same fate as our
memies. 1 he course adopted was to enlist the active co-operation of the
Arab rulers allied to us, namely, Ibn Saud and the Shaikh of Kuwait, the one
to prevent leakage of supplies across his frontier to the enemy and the other
to refuse access to the Kuwait market to enemy purchasing ao-ents The
arrangemeuts by which these objects were to be achieved were felt entirely
the d is ret ion of the two rulers themselves in accordance with our com
.istent policy ot refraining from interference in the internal arrangements
do so eXCept When clrcums tances make it absolutely necessary to
ninn-Vml ^P e ^ ment was ’ unfortunately, doomed to failure from the beo-in-
nmg and it failed—its only substantial result being to enhance the bitteifp^
and antipathy already existing between Ibn Saud and Ibn Subah.
• f Inde . ed > some time before the departure of the Mission from Bao-hdad
clearThat°Kuwait had^n^ri ^ un P r ei udi ce d sources made it abundantly
ciear tnat Kuwait had, m consequence of the tightening of the Iran hi on tad/
>egun to enjoy a profitable monopoly as a source of enemv snrmlv* wl ;i +1 ’
r°- i:
or connivance of the Shaikh himcoii; ; -i. witn the sanction-
from lad that it should he de^nS Si„°‘ Sr
doub^s^lSeefved^Telcome'addS , re8Ult ,*** th * enem >’-
Iraq linesh Kuwait S to en^htnt’ion. 1 ” 8 “ ^ ^
blessing in dfsguisf MtST TV'”" ^ referred to P ro ™d to be a-
on which to ha'se both a comiilaint'ils reonrds''/l ' a ' S °t I<I 'V" 1 ,l0, 1 0ri,JUS fact,
respect of the future Tn dn hi • h-° a ^ P as ^ and an ultimatum in
tei^pt to defend^ii^untenable^positi^n! 06 Ashre^u-ds Turki’^act' 86 ^ 0 ^ 3 a4 "
^L t SL p r a stc?iittsSr n ArV”»^ n ^
safe conduct throuo-h the \ nd irih ^. Kuwait—it was indeed merely a
the extension to enemy subiects of pW * 1 1 ° load ’ ni ! ; c °uld not explain
Shaikh Salim’s expiration of thp p? Ch a " oncessi ^ as this. Doubtless
convincing. exp atlon ° f the clearance the enemy caravan was equally
gone to the enemy ^ 0 ( 1 ^ ^ s' regard s’ em v Trid^^ 1 that ^ 7 C01 } ld ? nly liave
strongly against the Shaikh of hr 11T -f f .trade m general, he inveighed
cated iLontrahand h„ s SeL on^ of whfch hT g I JT nally and ie ^
ed that the hulk of the traffic went dTvilA ’T' 6 lar » e P^te. He assert-
giving liis own frontiers a wide hertl. 1 +°i m ^ v ' 1 1 ^ f° Hail or Damascus,
;f the Qasim were X to a certain eiw ! ’ e a , dm } tted r , th »t the merchant
however, that this was scarcely consistent with