File 1707/1924 ‘Arabia:- Jeddah Situation Reports. (1924-1930)’ [‎15r] (34/898)

eI i d f d a Promise by the Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan Howaitat to kill the Shararat and Billi
ol JNejd it and when the investigation reopened. Fortunately the matter was
aJlowed to slide.
These goings-on threw a great deal of work upon His Majesty's Government
and tne Legation at Jedda. Although the Hejaz-Nejd Government did not cavil
at the decision of His Majesty s Government to allow their investigator full
discretion in interpreting the ‘ ‘ reasonable ; ’ delay permissible for past notifica-
■tions of raids (August report, section 7), they were obdurate in the matter of
the proposed voluntary tribal settlements (ibid), their subjects having submitted
their claims to their Government, they said, the latter had verified them and
requested the British Government to arbitrate, the claimants themselves had
therefore nothing more to say in the matter. At bottom, Ibn Saud was probably
unwilling that his tribes should compound and fraternise with those of the Amir
Abdullah. In the same note from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs the
representations made by His Majesty’s Charge Affaires in regard to the use
of the oath were met by a “ non possumus ’ ’ on the grounds that such use would
entail the loss of the established rights of the subjects of the Hejaz-Nejd. This
curious statement was explained by Fuad Bey, who visited Jedda on the 29th
September to mean that, having successfully resisted the imposition of the oath
at the abortive Maan and Jericho tribunals (and thereby, incidentally, contributed
to their abortiveness) the Hejaz-Nejd Government could not now accept the use
of the oath at Amman.
His Majesty’s Charge d’Affaires was instructed to represent to the Acting
Minister for Foreign Affairs the gravity of the situation created by his Govern
ment’s attempt thus to fetter the free hand given by Ibn Saud to His Majesty’s
Government to conduct the arbitration as they thought fit. He was also authorised,
should his representations fail of decisive effect within forty-eight hours, to
convey to Ibn Saud himself a strongly-worded message from His Majesty’s
Government, Two long interviews took place between Mr. Hope-Gill and Fuad
Bey on the 29th and 30th September. As a result, the latter curtailed his visit,
left early on the 1st October for Taif, and on the next morning telephoned to
say that instructions had been sent to the Hejaz-Nejd agent at Amman to conform
to Mr. MacDonnell’s procedure in the matter of the oath and to answer all
properly notified Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan claims (except those relating to Ibn Mashhur),
but not to countenance voluntary settlements. The last point, not being clearly in
the nature of interference with His Majesty’s Government’s discretionary powers,
was allowed to drop. The Hejaz-Nejd Government’s climb-down over the first
two points, however, allowed the investigation to proceed and joint sittings were
resumed on the 6th October.
But only for a day. The Ibn Jazi brawl was now the obstacle, reinforced a
little later and for a time by the Zaal incident. On the 4th October the Acting
Minister for Foreign Affairs telephoned to His Majesty’s Charge d’Affaires that
Ibn Saud had just received news of an insult levelled by Ibn Jazi at the Hejaz-
Nejd agent and Government and was considering making official representations
to His Majesty’s Government. It was unfortunate that Mr. Hope-Gill had not
been placed in full possession of the facts, the information at his disposal being
hardly calculated to answer Fuad Bey’s arguments or to satisfy the King. He
therefore impressed upon the former the desirability of confining the effects of
any wordy strife that had taken place between Bedouin at Amman to local
appeasement by Mr. MacDonnell and/or the Amir Abdullah, rather than enlarge
them into the international sphere. He also telegraphed for more adequate
information in order to prevent this new obstacle from taking concrete form,
but all to no purpose. In a note dated the 5th October the Hejaz-Nejd Govern
ment officially demanded a written apology from the Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan Government,
to be publicly read in session at Amman and thereupon conveyed to them through
His Majesty’s Government and the diplomatic channel; also the exemplary
punishment of Ibn Jazi. On the 7th October the Hejaz-Nejd agent withdrew
from the investigation pending receipt of that satisfaction.
The rest of the month was devoted to an exchange of views as to the nature
and amount of the satisfaction to be given. The Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan Government
considered that the Ibn Jazi incident was closed, the Amir himself having
conveyed his regrets at once to the Hejaz-Nejd agent and caused him and Ibn
Jazi to shake hands, and also having taken the latter severely to task for his
behaviour towards a guest of the country. The Hejaz-Nejd Government agreed
with His Majesty’s Government that the incident should be separated from the
investigation proper, and they therefore instructed their agent to continue to