File 1707/1924 ‘Arabia:- Jeddah Situation Reports. (1924-1930)’ [‎65v] (135/898)

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4. Voluminous protests m the same
also received from the Acting Master for g Goverll ment of breach of faith,
public utterances as to accuse His i J'J,. January that the question of the
Sheikh Fuad Hamza was informed on the IbthJa y looal authorities and
disposal of the rebels was being dea t with direct betwee were bei
the King, and that, after consultation with the latter,^ar 8^ the vario f
made for a meeting with him m ord i , Government preferred to await
points at issue. In the circumstances His Majesty s teovei f
the outcome of that High Commissioner in Iraq was informed
5. In the meanwhile His Maj . y - » , Sand was now encamped,
by the Prime Minister of the Iraq Governm ^ excellent opportunity
close to the Iraq frontier the t Ira y.y“X to discuss the settlement of outstanding
presented itself for a ^ n^emments d King Feisal, he added, was so impressed
ssrs sx;;*, a, .«.
discussion of these^uestion. ^ fey the Iraq Gove^nmen^toconvey to
invitation to Ibn Saud. J n t.h^efisting atnmsphere of distrust between the Iraq
anxious to try and dissipate the existing atmospnere 01 a . SU g-o- e sted that
and Neid Governments by a personal meeting with Ibn baud, and sugges a nat
Sir F Humphrys should also be present. Matters for discussion included (a) d sposal
o rebel reto'ees (b) return of loot; (o) breaches of article 4 of the Bahra Agreement;
w extraditfon; e) treaty of bon voisinacfe; (/) mutual recognition of the two
Governments and exchange of representatives, and (<?) desert posts, the last of which
was regarded as the most important point of ^11 • . ^ , • • p 4? t-K -
7 " Sir F. Humphrys reported that he himself was prima facie m favour of this
proposal, as the feeling of hostility between Iraq and Neid could hardly be worse,
and P there seemed a chance that, even if the conference failed to solve any outstanding
questions, the way might be prepared by personal contact for a better mutual
understanding. His Majesty’s Government, however, considered it important that
the main question of the disposal of the refugees should he settled before the meeting
took place between Ibn Saud and King Feisal, and therefore that the meeting between
His Maiesty’s political agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. at Koweit and Ibn baud should first be held. His
Maiesty’s Government anticipated that, once this question were disposed of, a more
favourable atmosphere would prevail, and thus that the proposed conference between
Ibn baud and King Feisal would have greater prospects of success.
8 On the 16th January His Majesty’s Government communicated to the
political resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. at Bushire the conclusions which they had reached regarding the
disposal of the rebels. In view of the importance of the issues involved, and of
the delicate situation which had arisen, they considered it in the highest degree
desirable that he himself should assume personal charge of the mission to Ibn Saud,
and should take with him His Majesty’s political agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. at Koweit, and, subject to
the consent of the High Commissioner in Iraq, Air Commodore Burnett, to whose
presence as a military adviser His Majesty’s Government attached great importance.
9. His Majesty’s Government also stated that, having regard to the fact that
the assistance and' co-operation of the British military forces had been the
determining factor in the suppression of the revolt, they could not but take exception
to the tone of recent communications from Ibn Saud and from the Hejaz Government.
In the circumstances they were of opinion that a dignified and stiff remonstrance
was called for. They considered it to be preferable, however, that this should be
■conveyed by word of mouth rather than by written communication.
10. Lieutenant-Colonel Biscoe was accordingly instructed to explain to
Ibn Saud on arrival at his camp that His Majesty’s Government had never agreed
to hand over rebels who might surrender, and, as had already been explained to him,
the only thing that had prevented His Majesty’s Government from expelling the
rebel tribes prior to their surrender had been the fact that they were accompanied by
their women and children against whom military action could not be taken.
Ibn Saud was to be reminded that he had been warned of this contingency as long ago
as the middle of October. At the same time, he was to be left in no doubt as to the
exception taken by His Majesty’s Government to his recent communications. His
Majesty’s Government also laid stress on the necessity of obtaining from the King
written and binding guarantees that, if the leaders were handed over, (a) their lives