File 1707/1924 ‘Arabia:- Jeddah Situation Reports. (1924-1930)’ [‎333v] (671/898)

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3. The news of the decision of His Majesty's Government caused some excil^
ment and depression in the small circle here that takes an active part in the wax.
The Syrian leaders of the army desired to resist the British occupation of Ma an
and Akaba to the death, or, alternatively, to make a demonstration outside the British
Agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. in Jeddah. They were, however, calmed by the King, who submitted to the
inevitable, after an inacceptable suggestion that the disputed territory should remair
under the Hedjaz until the end of the war, when it should revert to Transjordania.
Financially, Ma’an and Akaba are a burden to the Hedjaz, but they are important
as a link in the only way of communication with Medina when the tribes in the holy
quadrilateral are “ up,” or when, as at present, the ordinary routes are unsafe from
some other cause. It is probable that without Ma’an and Akaba the Hedjaz w r ould
have been beaten long ago. It is by that route that they have received several guns
and large supplies of ammunition from Medina and that Hussein has sent money to
the Medina garrison; and it was at Ma’an that the Palestinians and Transjordanians
were recruited who saved the situation when Ali was on the point of giving up the
struggle last November. Ali is of the opinion that, once cut off from Jeddah, Medina
must soon fall to the Wahabis, and he is probably right.
4. One curious result of the Ma’an-Akaba controversy is a belief, widespread in
Jeddah, and apparently shared by the Hedjaz authorities, that England may now be
expected to bring about peace, since she has got all she wanted. Ali is making
through the Amir Abdullah suggestions for British intervention, and he has asked
me w T hy His Majesty’s Government, while they are dealing with the northern
boundary, cannot also take up the question of the eastern boundary of the Hedjaz;
ail that is wanted is a resumption of the Koweit Conference.
5. King Hussein eventually accepted the invitation to go to Cyprus, and
H.M.S. “ Delhi ” left Akaba with a cargo which, if report is to be believed, resembled
those of all Masefield's ships—quinquereme, trader and galleon—rolled into one.
The three weeks’ grace granted him was a time of some anxiety here, as it was
believed until the last moment that he would return to Jeddah. Ali professes to
be glad that his father is out of the way, but as the money is also now out of the way
his joy is not unmixed. He w T ould like his father’s money without his father, of
course, but he would certainly rather have both than be deprived of Hussein’s
financial help.
6. In regard to the pilgrims who sailed from India for Rabigh, the Hedjaz
Government adopted a policy which brought them the maximum of odium and the
minimum of advantage. On the 30th May it became known that the two smallest
Hedjaz steamers had left for Rabigh with troops, machine guns and a gun or two
on board. The Foreign Secretary, when reminded by me that His Majesty’s Govern
ment did not recognise the Hedjaz blockade, said that they merely proposed to sink
any Hedjaz dhows they found and to engage from the sea any Wahabis who might
appear. On the 1st June, however, the foreign representatives in Jeddah received
from the Foreign Secretary a circular worded as follows : —
“ I have the honour to inform you that the Hedjaz military authorities, on
account of certain objections raised previously, have informed me of the estab
lishment of an effective blockade of Rabigh, ordered the steamer £ Tawil ’ to
perform that duty and to remain there and some armed dhows with her, and
given twelve days’ notice with effect from the date of this letter, after the expiry
of which everything coming to Rabigh will be dealt with in accordance with the
law of blockade.
“ Moreover, please note that Rabigh is a theatre of war, that it is to-day
being bombarded from the sea and that land operations against it are being
begun.”
I rom this it seemed that if British pilgrims were to be landed safely it would
be necessary to refuse to recognise the new blockade, since only the first ship could
reach Rabigh before the expiry of the notice, and to procure from Aden or elsewhere
dhows which would be protected by our flag from interference by Hedjaz vessels.
In the event all turned out well, because when it came to the pinch the Hedjaz
Government boggled at applying the blockade to British ships, and because the
formation of Rabigh harbour—unique, it seems, on the whole Hedjaz coast—
prevented the Hedjaz Government from carrying out their intention to destroy or
capture any Hedjaz dhow A term adopted by British officials to refer to local sailing vessels in the western Indian Ocean. putting off from the shore to disembark pilgrims.
7. The first pilgrim ship, the ‘‘ Jehangir,” reached Port Sudan on the 5th June.
The agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. doctor and Indian clerk w^ere waiting there, having been unable to get a