File 1707/1924 ‘Arabia:- Jeddah Situation Reports. (1924-1930)’ [‎381v] (767/898)

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Government more and more uneasy. On the 18th January, when the two aeroplanes
were flying over the Wahabi camps, an explosion was seen to take place in one of
them; it turned over and over and crashed. The pilot was M. bhirokoy, a Russian
refugee, and with him were two Arabs, one of whom was Umar Shakir, editor of
the “ Falah ” newspaper in King Hussein’s time. This man, a Syrian, was a
trained agriculturalist, but preferred violent journalism to the more humdrum
occupation of agriculture. Having been condemned to death by the French
authorities in Syria, he fled to King Hussein, who of course received him with open
arms. He had been clamouring to be allowed to go and drop bombs on the Wahabis,
and on the fatal occasion he seems to have secured a seat in the aeroplane, without
authority, through friendship with the Arab observer. It is assumed that he tried
to throw one of the make-shift bombs, and that it exploded in the aeroplane. The
explosion probably killed all the occupants; if not, they cannot have survived the
crash, for the machine fell from a great height. The Jeddah guns kept the Wahabis
off in daylight, but after dark the aeroplane was seen to have been set on fire. With
this casualty and the departure of a pilot who fell ill, the number of Russian pilots
is reduced to one.
5. The blockade can probably be considered dead. In reply to the contention
raised by this agemy, that the steamship “ Tawil ” could not be regarded as
constituting an effective blockade of the southern ports, the Hedjaz Government
stated that the blockade was quite effective, the “ Tawil ” being supported by a
patrol of dhows, the number of which was, however, an Admiralty secret! Just
after this, however, the “ Tawil ” returned to Jeddah, as did the “ Raghmatain,”
which had been sent up to institute the blockade of Rabigh. Both of them, as well
as the larger steamer “ Radhwa,” are standing by for a possible evacuation. So
far as my information goes, only one craft was captured and condemned—a Hedjaz
dhow A term adopted by British officials to refer to local sailing vessels in the western Indian Ocean. . This was at Kunfudah.
6. It had been hoped that the pompous correspondence between the Consular
Corps and Ibn Sand about the safety of foreigners was at an end, but he revived
the subject with a rather naive letter which, with the subsequent correspondence, is
given as an enclosure to this report. The contention that any harm that might
happen to foreigners could only be caused by other people, since the Wahabis are
above such things, and above all, the incidental statement that the atrocities at Tail
were committed by the Hedjaz troops, could not be left unchallenged. It is possible
that Ibn Saud is a little uneasy about some of the local Arabs, whose help he has
tried to enlist (doubtless by promises of loot, since nothing else that he can give
wmuld appeal to them), and that his letter is for quotation if these Arabs should get
out of hand. In any case, our only weapon is to continue to insist to Ibn Saud on
the rights of non-combatant foreigners, since, if the Jeddah defences give, the King,
with all the officials and as many of the troops as can join them, will leave the
country, and public order will depend on the extent of Ibn Saud’s control over his
people. We do not, in point of fact, expect that there will be any serious trouble.
7. ihe delegates sent to Jeddah by the Indian Caliphate Committee finally
gave up the pretence that they had come to the Hedjaz solely in the interests of
peace, and gave the Foreign Secretary a copy of their aims (see Enclosure 3). The
re eTences to Hedjaz participation, at the end of paragraphs 2 and 7, were not
m the original they had with them, but were added here as a sop to such nationalist
feeling as there is in Jeddah; the last thing the Caliphate Committee seem to have
ought °f tho views of the Hedjaz people. The aims agree closely with those set
torth by Ibn Saud, and support the evidence that he and the Indian Moslem
extremists have been working together. The reference to the Imam Yahya is
interesting. It was stated here several months ago that Ibn Saud and the Imam
tr er f ( ? 0 "°P erate f° s^ze the whole of Asir and to divide the spoil between them;
odeidah, of course, going to the Imam. This may explain the rather greater
activity the Imam has been showing lately.
The delegates are still here. They wrote to Ibn Saud saying that they wanted
to see him and asking him three questions: (1) whether the reports of atrocities
committed by Wahabis at Taif were true; (2) whether by treaty he had placed Nejd
under foreign influence; and (3) whether he had given any concession or concessions
o oreignei s. Ibn Samd replied urging them to join him quickly, and telling them
hat as to them questions they should not believe his enemies; they would be fully
satisfied when they met him. In view, however, of the delegates’ admitted hostility
to King Ah and of the general nature of their proposals, the Hedjaz Government