File 1707/1924 ‘Arabia:- Jeddah Situation Reports. (1924-1930)’ [‎396r] (796/898)

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rihis Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government. 1
EASTERN (Arabia).
CONFIDENTIAL.
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No. 1.
[November 17, 1924.!
V. ? J
Section 1 .
E 9974/7624/91]
Consul Bullard to Mr. MacDonald.—{Received 'November 17 )
(No. 105.)
Si r > Jeddah, October 30, 1924.
I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the
21st-30th October.
2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt,
Khartoum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut (for Damascus), Aden’
Singapore, Bushire, Koweit and Bahrein.
I have, &c.
B. W. BULLARD.
Enclosure in No. 1.
Jeddah Report for October 21-30, 1924.
(Secret.)
THE correspondence between the people of Jeddah and the Wahabis culminated
in the despatch of a deputation to Mecca. According to the report which the deputation
brought back, the Wahabi general, Khalid, offered the most handsome terms. The only
condition he laid down was that the Amir Ali should either be seized or forced to leave
the country ; if that condition was complied with, Jeddah had nothing to fear; all the
officials would be maintained in their posts, and not only would no harm be done to the
people, but Khalid would not even send Wahabi troops to Jeddah, but would leave
the town to govern itself; but if they failed to seize Ali or to force him to leave, the
Wahabis would take Jeddah by force, and would treat the town as they treated Taif.
This message was only what was to be expected ; Khalid would naturally wish to
secure Jeddah as he secured Mecca, without fighting. The threat of frightfulness was
very likely bluff, but it was taken at its face value at Jeddah, where the population fell
into a state of abject fright. This feeling was intensified when Ali finally announced
his determination to fight. The leading men, stimulated by Khalid s message and by a
telegram from Ibn Sand’s secretary at Bahrein, saying that Ibn Saud would never make
peace so long as Hussein or his sons ruled in the Hedjaz, pointed out to Ali that his
presence alone stood in the way of peace, and he promised to abdicate and leave the
country if they would make the demand in writing ; but when the. demand, signed by
everyone of importance, was presented, he went back on his promise. In his decision
to resist he has been encouraged, as was stated in the last report, by the Bagdadi and
Syrian officers and by the arrival of reinforcements from Transjordania and the Druse
country. Other factors which have contributed to the decision are the constant
encouragement he receives from the ex-King Hussein and the Amir Abdullah, t e . ope
that something will come of Mr. Philby’s visit, the arrival of a stock of ammunition
from Europe and the discovery of a Turkish officer who is believed to possess t e secret
of nicilviiiP’ trenches
2. Acting on instructions from His Majesty’s Government, I informed the Hedjaz
Government that Mr. Philby’s visit was not authorised by them and that he has no
authority to negotiate in their name. They replied that they quite un ers oo _^ •
Mr. Philby had asked if he might come as a friend, and they could not refuse. . This
does not prevent their representing the visit, privately, as authorise J 18 9j es y s
Government and as offering, in consequence, high hopes of a success u issue. o one
in Jeddah, except perhaps the Amir Ali and his entourage,, believes that Mr. I i by
comes as a private person, and one cannot blame them for their suspicions. Mr. i y
arrived on the 28th October. He just missed the mail steamer at buez, and, to avoid
a delay of ten days, he came down on a cargo boat, and the Hedjaz Government sent a
launch some miles out to sea to take him off. Ihis unusual met oc o rave mg an
landing only increased the suspicion attaching to the visit.
3 On the 21st October the Khedivial mail boat landed la6 cases of ammunition
which they had brought over from Port Sudan. Ihe instructions receive y e
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