Ext 6552/41 ‘Security Organisation in Persia’ [‎47v] (94/320)

on the understanding that they would first be sent to Kermanshah for preliminary
interrogation. On the 19th July the three Germans were delivered to the British
authorities. As a result of further pressure, the Prime Minister agreed on the
22nd July that by the 25th he would hand over eleven of the eighteen, but no
action was taken, and Mr. Soheily fell from power soon afterwards.
3. During the period from the time of the occupation in August 1941 to
the fall of Mr. Soheily in July 1942 there had been cases where Persians, living
in areas occupied by British military forces, had been sent away into
“unoccupied” territory on the charge of being hostile to the Allies. Thus
about twenty persons were deported from Abadan to Tehran at the request of the
A.I.O.C., and several were sent away from Hamadan by the Political Adviser,
or at his request. It was an open question whether the best way to deal with such
persons was to transfer them to some part of Persia where they were no longer
under our observation, but it was always realised that the British military
authorities could not permit dangerous persons to reside within their lines.
These deportations caused much correspondence and discussion between the
Persian Government and the legation. Another cause of dispute was the
vagueness as to the place of detention of suspects handed over by the Persian
Government; some were removed from Kermanshah to Ahwaz, which in summer
is regarded rather as the French regard French Guiana, and the misunder
standings and protests were intensified when a very -old official named
Wabbizada, who had been arrested by the British military authorities in the south
and removed to Ahwaz, died a few days later. When, therefore, Mr. Soheily was
succeeded by Qawam-al-Saltana, it was decided to try to establish an agreed
procedure to obviate our having to haggle for each suspect or group of suspects
and to submit to constant complaints because men already under arrest had been
moved to Ahwaz, had not been interrogated, and so on. To begin with, a new list
(this list, which bore forty-five names, included a few of the persons named in the
list of eighteen, and several Germans) was drawn up, consisting entirely of names
of persons implicated in the evidence given by Germans or Persians already in
British custody. His Majesty’s Government and the British military
authorities concerned agreed that suspects should be detained at Sultanabad,
which is on the plateau, and not sent to Ahwaz or elsewhere, and His Majesty’s
Government also agreed that the Persians should participate both in the interroga
tion and in the supervision of the suspects. The Prime Minister was prompt to
secure the arrest of nearly all the persons on the list, and he handed over the
Germans, but he held out for the detention of the Persian suspects at Tehran, and
appealed to the Foreign Office through the Persian Minister in London.
Meanwhile, the press indulged in a violent campaign against the ‘ ‘ Allies ’ ’ on
this question, and it was several days before the Government’s proclamation about
the powers of military governorship put a stop to it. The Prime Minister’s
appeal to London having failed, owing to the proved unreliability of the Persian
police, he agreed to Sultanabad as a place for detention. The procedure which
should govern the detention and interrogation of all suspects was worked out and
agreed to by the Persian Government and the legation. A copy of the conditions
is attached.
4. The place of detention at Sultanabad has been got ready and the first
batch of suspects was despatched thither from Tehran on the 24th September.
5. One of the difficulties against which we have had to fight has been the
lack of support from our allies. The United States Minister was inclined at first
to consider the original Persian proposals adequate, viz., that the suspects
should be detained at Tehran and tried by Persian law. He was eventually
persuaded to go so far as to assure the Persian Government that the fifth column
was a real danger which they ought to eliminate, but by then the question of
principle had, in fact, been settled. The Soviet Embassy has evidently received
instructions not to do anything which might be interpreted as interference in the
internal affairs of Persia, and has quoted this principle on more than one
occasion, so that it could not be expected that they would put pressure on the
Persian Government in support of our suspect policy. This has, however, not
prevented their trying to secure our help on various occasions. It was at Soviet
instigation that we requested the Swiss Legation to repatriate two Swiss subjects
hitherto resident at Meshed and alleged by the Russians to be anti-Ally.
Similarly, in Tabriz, when the Russians wished to secure the arrest of a number
of persons alleged to be indulging in anti-Ally propaganda, they tried to obtain
the support of His Majesty’s Consul-General, who wisely confined his support
to giving the local authorities a list of the persons whom he believed to be engaged
in such propaganda. It is our contention that in places in which they have