File 299/1918 Pt 2 'Persia - policy; Shiraz situation; Bushire operations' [‎87r] (179/605)

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From Viceroy, Foreign Department, lOth April 1919.
(Received 11 a.m.)
Clear the line.
Secret. Your telegram of 21st March. Bushire-Shiraz operations. Sheikh of
Mohammerah with whom Bill has discussed Kashgai question informally is convinced
he can bring Soulet to reason, provided he is made to visit Mohammerah, and that we
agree to his reinstatement as head of tribe, no other lllkhani being in his opinion
possible. He recognises difficulty of F. F.,and necessity for cash payment being made
to him by Soulet, but believes that he can be squared, and agrees, though reluctantly,
to absence of Soulet from Fars for a month or so. He does not favour visit (? to Tehran).
Bill strongly recommends Sheikh’s intervention. General Officer Commanding,
Bushire, is also inclined to favour it as against direct negotiations, as Soulet’s
suspicions of us may have been aroused by dela}^ over giving him a final answer.
Cox comments on Bill’s recommendation as follows (unessentials omitted).
“ It is clear F. F. will not be pleased at Mohammerah-Baghdad solution, but
Soulet is a permanent factor, and F. F. is not. The position as regards Persian
Government is that at beginning of March, Prime Minister telegraphed to F. F. that
Soulet was to come to Tehran via Mohammerah, and these orders have not been altered
or apparently questioned. Once we have got Soulet to Mohammerah we shall be in a
position to control his further movements, and there is no reason why we should send
him on to Tehran if for any reason we do not wish it. On the whole, therefore, I am
of opinion the best solution will be to accept Mohammerah proposal in principle. I
have discussed with Prime Minister, and there will be no objection from here. I have
great hopes of effect on Soulet of visit to Mohammerah and Mesopotamia.
“ Details of procedure must (? however ) be left to our local representatives
concerned. If Mohammerah arrangement is finally decided upon, F. F. would
probably be appeased by friendly message asking him to fall in with our views in
general interests of country.”
Settlement with Soulet before evacuation of troops is the all (? essential point),
and we solicit very early authority to authorise it at once. Though we are reluctant
to forego political capital to be derived from adoption by ourselves of role of peace
maker, and also prefer active participation of Governor-General in settlement (as
recommended in our telegram of 7th March), these are matters of detail which may be
left to local officers. Like Sheikh, however, we are strongly of opinion Soulet’s
absence from his tribe should be of shortest possible duration.
Above, from “ settlement with Soulet” onwards, has been repeated to Tehran
and General Officer Commanding, Bushire.