"المصالح البريطانية في ساحل الجزيرة العربية والكويت والبحرين وقطر" [ظ‎‎٢] (٤/٤)

desirous that a treaty should be made in anticipation of the death of Sheikh
Jasim. An opportunity of making such a treaty arose last year, when the
Turks disturbed the status quo by appointing officials to various places on
the coast, and when the Government of India proposed that a treaty should
be entered into with Sheikh Ahmed on the lines of our treaties with Bahrein
and the Trucial Chiefs, by which he would be debarred from dealings with
Foreign Powers, and from parling with territory to others than the British
Government. The Turks, however, withdrew their interloping officials in
deference to our remonstrances; and the Government of India were
instructed to report whether the objects to be gained by a treaty were of
such urgent importance as to justify immediate action in spite of the diffi
culties which such action w r ould create with the Turks. The Government of
India replied, in their telegram of the 30th December, by proposing the
immediate conclusion with Sheikh Ahmed of a treaty similar to that of 186S,
which would bind him to take no hostile action by sea, and to refer all
disputes to the Resident in the Persian Gulf.
The reasons in favour of the immediate conclusion of a treaty are—
(1.) The Katr coast, lying as it does between Bahrein and the Pirate
coast, constitutes a break in the continuity of our maritime
influence.
(2.) The absence of a treaty may hinder His Majesty's ships in the work
of suppressing piracy and maintaining the peace of the Gulf.
In this connection it may be observed that the objection to the
extension of Turkish authority in those regions is that the Turks
cannot establish a strong administration, and that their attempt
to rule El Katr might only end in anarchy. Bahrein, as the
centre of the pearl fisheries, attracts pirates.
(3.) The absence of a treaty considerably increases the difficulty of
making arrangements to protect the pearl fisheries from outside
interference which has been threatened by certain Frenchmen
settled in Bahrein. The question of what powers we possess in
this respect under our existing treaties with the local Sheikhs is
under the consideration of the Law Officers of the Crown.
(4.) The absence of a treaty may encourage the Turks to set up a rival
Sheikh to Sheikh Ahmed on the death of Sheikh Jasim. In this
connection it may be observed that Sheikh Ahmed and the Arabs
of El Katr are Wahabis, and presumably sympathise with Ibn,
Saoud m his attack on Turkish authority in the interior. It
is thus of importance to them that the new Sheikh should be on
their side against Ibn Saoud.
From the point of view of the Government of India, the balance of
advantage seems to lie on the s : de of a treaty with Sheikh Ahmed; and it
has been suggested that, as any treaty with him will raise a difficulty with
the Turks, if there is to be a treaty, it should be on the lines of those with
the Trucial Chiefs.
On the other hand, if we make a treaty it will be incumbent on us to
support Sheikh Ahmed if, on the death of Sheikh Jasim, he becomes
embroiled with the Turks, and a fresh chapter of difficulties with the Porte
may be opened. To leave the situation in El Katr to work itself out
without interlerence on our part, even though the ultimate result may be
the restoration of a nominal Turkish sovereignty, would not be inconsistent
with the policy laid down in Lord Lansdowne's Minute of 21st March 1902,
as to the position at Koweit. Lord Lansdovvne slated that the " be;! rock "
of our policy in the Gulf is that " while w T e do not grudge a debouche for
44 international commerce in the Gulf, and have no wish to make it into a
*' British lake, Ave should resist to the utmost all attempts by other Powers
" to obtain a foothold on its shores for naval or military purposes ....
44 We shall pursue that policy not in virtue of ambiguous understandings
with local Chiels, but as the predominant Power in Southern Persia and
the Persian Gulf."
B. Ejtchie.
30th January 1905.