"العلاقات بين حكومة صاحب الجلالة في المملكة المتحدة وشيخ الكويت" [و‎‎٣] (٢٠/٥)

correspondence with Ibn Saud had assumed an increasing importance, and tell
him that that correspondence must now cease.
Mr. Rendel concurred. A straightforward control of this nature would be
easier to maintain, and would prevent a repetition of such incidents as the letter
in which Ibn Saud had recently tried to detach the Sheikh of Koweit from his
connexion with His Majesty's Government.
Sir A. Ryan also concurred, and drew attention to the success with which
Tbn Saud was spreading the idea that he might naturally absorb Koweit and was
bound to do so sooner or later. He pointed out that such an idea could never
have prevailed to the extent to which it had, if His Majesty's Government had
equally definitely made known their own special position with regard to Koweit.
The meeting then discussed what point in the correspondence between the
Sheikh and Ibn Saud could most suitably be taken up in connexion with the
reprimand which it was proposed to address to both parties.
Mr. Laithwaite suggested that if it were discovered that the Sheikh had
committed himself to Ibn Saud in regard to the grant of an oil concession in
the Koweit Neutral Zone, this might be an excellent opportunity for checking
him. The question then arose, what action could be taken if the United States
Government, in dealing with whom His Majesty's Government had consistently
emphasised the Sheikh's independence, were to produce communications from
him regarding the grant of a concession in the Neutral Zone ? It was, however,
agreed that His Majesty's Government could demonstrate from the Sheikh's
treaty engagements that he had not been entitled to make any such grant without
our knowledge and consent. Eventually it was agreed that the most suitable
occasion for the proposed representations to the Sheikh and Ibn Saud would be
Ibn Saud's letter suggesting terms for the settlement of the Saudi blockade of
Koweit and warning the Sheikh against His Majesty's Government.
At the conclusion of the meeting Sir A. Ryan raised the question of the
pressure which might be exerted upon Ibn Saud in regard to the Saudi blockade
of Koweit. This blockade had one of two purposes, either to complete the
economic strangulation of Koweit and lead to its complete absorption in Saudi
Arabia, or else the safeguarding of Saudi economic interests. His Majesty's
Government could not possibly allow the first of these alternatives. The question,
therefore, was what real force there was in Ibn Saud's suggestion that his own
purely economic interests required the maintenance of the blockade.
Colonel Fowls suggested that we might well revert to the Sheikh s proposal
that Ibn Saud should have customs posts at a given place along but outside the
Koweiti border, and that this might, if necessary, be coupled with a system of
manifests for Koweiti-Saudi trade. He gave it as his opinion that even if
Ibn Saud were to develop Ras Tanura, possibly with American help, this port was
not likely to compete seriously with Koweit, which served quite a different hinter
land. nor was there any port between the Koweit area and the Ras Tanura area
which could be successfully developed as a rival to Koweit.
Colonel Fowle suggested that on his return to the Gulf on the 16th October
he should discuss the situation with Colonel Dickson, Political Agent, Koweit,
who had great experience of the sheikhdom, in the light of the conversations at the
present meeting, and should submit a comprehensive report. It was agreed that
this course should be adopted, and that in the light of the Resident's report and
of the conclusions of the present meeting the question of future policy in Koweit
should be discussed if necessary in the Middle East Official Sub-Committee.
The conclusions of the meeting were as follows ;—
(1) That in dealing with Ibn Saud, His Majesty's Government should
increasingly emphasise the closeness of their relations with the Sheikh.
(2) That the Sheikh should be told that his personal correspondence with
Ibn Saud on official matters was to cease.
(3) That the issue of the. Saudi blockade of Koweit should be taken up with
Ibn Saud by His Majesty's Government on the basis of their obligation
to protect the interests of Koweit.