"العلاقات بين حكومة صاحب الجلالة في المملكة المتحدة وشيخ الكويت" [ظ‎‎٣] (٢٠/٦)

6
(4) That on receipt of the despatch promised by Colonel Fowle the whole
question of relations between His Majesty's Government and Koweit
might suitably be referred for further discussion to the Middle East
Official Sub-Committee, to which a note should be sent recording the
points discussed at the present meeting, and setting forth the argu
ments for and against the possible declaration of a protectorate.
Appendix A.
Note by Sir Andrew Ryan.
Ihn Saud's Attitude towards Koweit.
I HAVE been turning over in my mind for some time the possibility that it
may be a definite object of Ibn Saud s policy to reduce Koweit to a position of
dependence on him somewhat similar to that of Asir from 1926 to 1930. This is
in the nature of a pure speculation, but it is a speculation so interesting that 1
think it worth while to collect the principal data bearing on it. It must be
admitted at the outset that, if Ibn Saud had such an idea in his head,^ he would
realise the need for great caution lest he should indispose His Majesty's Govern
ment. His only formal obligation towards the latter is that contained in article 6
of the Treaty of Jedda, but he understands very well the implications of the words
therein "who are in special treaty relations with His Britannic Majesty's Govern
ment." On the other hand, he has seen His Majesty's Government tolerate direct
correspondence on business subjects between him and the Sheikh of Koweit. He
might think that they would' not react over strongly if he and the Sheikh
confronted them with the fait accomyli of a political deal.
2. Apart from the correspondence, of which we have knowledge, there has
been other intercourse between the rulers, notably the Sheikh's visit to Riadh in
1932, the secret messages brought by Ibn Saud's confidential messenger to the
Sheikh early this year, and the Sheikh's mysterious dashes intoNejd last February,
when Colonel Dickson surmised that he had gone to meet some high baudi
personage, possibly Ibn Saud himself.
3. I may interpolate, as a minor indication of Ibn Saud's attitude, a
reference to two occasions on which it has been suggested or hinted by his Ministry
for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government should not concern themselves
with affairs between Saudi Arabia and Koweit. I class them as minor, because
this position has never been categorically asserted. The first was when, in reply
to a complaint of mine regarding Saudi encroachments on Koweit territory, which
had perturbed His Majesty's Government, the reply was in effect: "Sorry you
have been perturbed. You need not have been ii the matter had been pursued
through An. Nafisi." On another occasion Fuad Bey, in rather light conversa
tion, asked me why we concerned ourselves in matters between his Government
and Koweit.
4. The personal relations between the two rulers are peculiar. Ibn Saud
grew up at Koweit, and it is sometimes said that he has shown himself ungrateful
to his former hosts. It is said by others, I do not know on what precise grounds,
that Mubarak treated Ibn Saud very badly. Anyhow, through all the relations
there runs a thread of old friendship, however flimsy and however frayed by
frequent friction over raids, the embargo and so on. It has helped towards the
settlement of minor questions. It has not deterred Ibn Saud from enforcing
the embargo on trade, but the embargo on trade has not destroyed the Sheikh s
ostensible friendliness towards Ibn Saud. They are "Arcades ambo,'' as I once
wrote, and they both combine some real friendship for His Majesty's Government
and a healthy fear of them with a good deal of fundamental mistrust.
5. The point of my theory or speculation is that, if the Sheikh of Koweit
were at all willing to be " Asirised." Ibn Saud could make the proposal quite
attractive on the following lines, if I may venture to put into his mouth the sort
of language he could use :—
(a) "You are not really independent, my dear fellow. You are under the
thumb of the English. They might annex you at any moment, or even
present you to Iraq. If you must be dependent on some one, why