"العلاقات بين حكومة صاحب الجلالة في المملكة المتحدة وشيخ الكويت" [و‎‎٨] (٢٠/١٥)

15
obligations to protect the interests of Koweit. The most important of these
obligations, which are dealt with in the India Office note on the subject, and the
one which in a sense determines any others there may be, is that of protection
against hostile incursions or invasions. His Majesty's Government's agreements
with the sheikh are three in number : that of January 1899, that of October
1907 and that of November 1914.
8. The agreement of 1899, as far as protection is concerned, in return
for the good behaviour of the sheikh and his successors, merely promised the
good offices" of His Majesty's Government, "whatever that may mean"" as
Lord Lansdowne later remarked. Our construction of this agreement appears to
have been the convenient one that we could choose the circumstances in which
we need, or need not, protect Koweit in any particular crisis that arose, the exact
area which we were responsible for defending being left more or less vague.
9. The agreement of 1907 merely confirmed from His Majesty's Govern
ment that " the town of Koweit and its boundaries " belonged to the sheikh of
that day and his successors. This agreement in no way added, in principle, to
our nebulous responsibilities for the defence of Koweit, though, possibly, read
with that of 1899, it might increase these responsibilities up to the
" boundaries."
10. The 1914 agreement states that, in return for the sheikh's co-operation
against the Turks, " Koweit shall be recognised as an independent principality
under British protection." This, unlike the phraseology of the previous agree
ments, is a most categorical assurance, and the word " principality," and not
"town," being used would seem definitely to place the responsibility of
protecting the whole of the Koweit sheikhdom on His Majesty's Government.
Personally, I cannot agree with the view quoted in paragraph 15 of the India
Office note that " on a strict reading our liability could be confined to the
protection of the town of Koweit, and that we are not called upon to protect
Koweit as a whole." It is true, as pointed out in the note (paragraph 16 (d)) ,
that neither the present sheikh, nor his predecessors, appear to have appealed
under this agreement to His Majesty's Government, but that hardly relieves us
from our obligations. This does not imply, of course, that His Majesty s
Government's obligations relieve the sheikh completely of the responsibility of
his own defence. The sheikh should certainly be able to deal with any small
raids across his frontiers, and should only look for assistance from His Majesty's
Government in the case of more serious incursions. This, in fact, was presumably
the attitude taken up after the Akhwan operations of 1928, when the sheikh was
encouraged to purchase half a dozen Ford vanettes, Lewis guns which were
mounted in the vanettes, and ammunition, and when some of his men received
training from the Royal Air Force as machine gunners.
11. In conclusion, I venture to suggest that this question, the exact extent
of the obligations of His Majesty's Government for the protection of Koweit, be
investigated with a view to a definite decision on the subject. The question is an
important one, and the advantages of having a clear conception of what our
responsibilities may be in time of crisis, before such a crisis arises, are obvious.
I am sending copies of this despatch to the Government of India and His
Majesty's Minister at Jedda.
I have, &c.
T. 0. FOWLE, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.
[E 7141/46/91]
3.— Mr. Johnstone to Mr. Laithwaite.
My dear Laithwaite, Foreign Office, November 25, 1933.
WITH reference to our telephone conversation yesterday, I write to confirm
what I said to you about Ryan's views on the proposed instructions to Dickson,
which are outlined in paragraph 6 of Fowle's official letter of the 25th October
regarding Saudi-Koweit relations.
On a cursory reading of that letter, Ryan concurred generally in the
proposed instructions, except for the opening clause, which states that Ibn Saud
intends to reduce Koweit to the same sort of position as Asir. In Ryan's view, it