'الملف 10/3 IV الامتياز النفطي بقطر' [داخلي‎-‎خلفي‎] (٥٣٤/٥٣٤)

Treaty of Jec..da read in conjunction v/ith the terms of
Article 3 of the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914 gives
us an even stronger case than we have hitherto imagined
ror refusing to admit that Ibn Saud possesses or has ever
possessed any rights to the east of the "blue line".
5. In the light of the legal opinion referred to
above, and of the considerations advanced in Ryan's
telegrams, we now therefore definitely incline to the
view that the balance of advantage is against maintaining
an indeterminate area, or "no man's land", ana in favour
of our taking our stand at once on the "blue line" not
only as the eastern boundary of Saudi Arabia but also as
the dividing line between that kingdom and the
territories of south-eastern Arabia coming within our
sphere# We are confirmed in this view by the request
of the United States Embassy at Angora for copies ol the
1913 and 1914 Gonventions, and by other signs ol
increasing American interest in this area, e.g. the
recently proposed visit of the United States Minister at
Bagdad iio Riyadh, and the various indications of an active
interest in oil possibilities on the part of the Standard
Oil of California•
6« But if on further consideration it is now
decided to abandon any attempt to maintain an
indeterminate ar«a, that does not mean that we should
necessarily favour any extension of any oil concession
granted in respect of Qatar or of any guarantee of
protection given by His Majesty's Government to the Sheikh
of Qatar heyond a line running south of a line drawn across
the base of the peninsula. Indeed, you will remember that
this question was considered in connexion with the formula
of/