"ملخص عن الخليج العربي. (الجزءان I و II)" [ظ‎‎٨] (١٢٠/١٦)

12
necessary is a question beyond my purview, but I oan conceive no quid p^o quo
which we could offer Porte in this sphere in exchange for withdrawal of her
pretensions. Possibly it could be found in some other sphere.
"In the event of coercive measures bein? necessary we can never expect
the recurrence of such a favourable juncture locally as at present exists. We
have strong squadron in the Persian Gulf in connection with arms traffic,
which would make naval demonstration simple matter, while the numerical
strength of Turkish military posts in question has just been reduced to
minimum under Nazim Pasha's scheme for concentrating troops at Baghdad.
" The achievement of above measures would be complete consolidation of
our position on Arab Coast and in Gulf generally, especially in regard to pearl
fishery question,* and if it is ever to
• r %de p«ge 57. ^ about, it seems essential
that action should be taken now. If action is delayed, the suggested association
of Turkey with Triple Alliance and the increase of her Navy may render the
task very difficult, if not impossible. In any cnse, therefore, I respectfully
urge necessity for adjusting position with Turkey forthwith by one method or
another, and eliminating the chronic elements of friction which have now
become dangerous.
" I consider that on grounds above explained, it would be useless now to
make treaty with Bin Thani, unless we are prepared to do so openly and to
bring about elimination of Turkisii influence from Katar as suggested in item
2 above. Without such simultaneous action, the existence of the treaty
would only be a source of dansrer to the Thani family from the present Turkish
regime and they would themselves fight shy of it. "
The Government of India added—
" We concur with Colonel Cox. In our opinion, unless the Turks can be
induced to confine themselves to their recognised possessions at Katif and Ojair,
no advantage would accrue from treaties with Katar Chiefs, and Chiefs would
probably not now agree to enter into treaties."
The matter regarding the proposed treaty was dropped. His Majesty's
Government were of opinionf (Decem-
f External B, March 1911, Nos. 13-30. , -i m a \ i-i * i i .ii
her 1910) that no advantage will accrue
from any treaty or treaties with the Katar Shaikhs from the point of view of
our relations with Turkey, unless the Turks can be induced to confine
themselves to their recognised possessions in El Katif. If, and when, the Turks
have been induced so to confine themselves, the treaties will, from an inter
national point of view, be no longer necessary.
This opinion has, however, since been modified and in connection with the
proposed general settlement with Turkey the India Office has suggested to the
Poreign Office that the door should be left open to us to conclude agreements
with the Katar people, if necessary— vide paragraph 3, Chapter III.
The wider issues raised by Colonel Cox and the suggestion to come to a
comprehensive settlement with Turkey are dealt with on pages 64 to 56.