'ملف رقم 9/50 (B 16) حادث دبي' [و‎‎٤‎٧] (٤٩٢/١٠٤)

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No. 87, dated Bushire, the 8th (received 17th) January 1911.
From L ieutenant- C olonel P. Z. Cox, C.S .I., C .I .E., Political Resident in the
Persian Guld,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.
I have the honour to reply, in amplification of my message* of
• Serial No. 39. 6th instant, to Poreign Department tele-
t Serial Ko. 27. gramf No. S.—3, dated 3rd January, on
the subject of the action recently taken at Debai.
I beg leave to discuss the several points touched upon in the latter com
munication, in the order of allusion.
2. The search took place without the —This is the
case; but it must be remembered that on the last occasion on which the Shaikh's
presence and co-operation were asked for, they were only forthcoming in a way
calculated to defeat the object in view and to make any search abortive. In the
present instance, Captain Dick believed that he had given the Shaikh every
opportunity of being present; and even if it be true that, as the Shaikh asserts,
no message reached him overnight regarding the contemplated landing, it
cannot reasonably be supposed that the Shaikh received no message from, or
news of, Captain Dick's party in the morning, and knew nothing of the landing
of 100 men within a stone's throw and within sight of his dwelling, at the time
or until so long afterwards as to prevent his joining the party for nearly two*
hours.
That the action of the Captain of H. M. S. " Hyacinth " was prudent, I
am not prepared to maintain. Captain Dick indeed realised that he was
taking considerable risk, but thought it was one which the circumstances
warranted him in taking. The chances of trouble were, however, undoubtedly
great and to one more familiar, as I am, with Arab character and oriental
prejudice generally, would have seemed to amount almost to a certainty.
But, on the other hand, the Shaikh's contributory negligence was patent,
and to have overlooked the fact and to have admitted, in spite of the Shaikh's
supine attitude, that the action of the Commander of His Majesty's ship was
unjustified, would have had the effect of preventing us from taking any
notice of the incident, a course which in my judgment would have been in the
highest degree prejudicial to our interests in the Gulf, and would greatly have
weakened the hands and damped the initiative of all the Commanders of His
Majesty's ships in these waters, engaged as they now are, on highly responsible
and difficult duties in connection with the arms blockade.
3. Some of the conditions imposed, such as the imposition of a fine of
50,000 rupees seem to the Government of
The four conditions which we called upon the Shaikh to complv with
within 48 hours were—
(i) Replacement of tide pole.
(ii) Acceptance of Telegraph installation as required by treaty, when
ever desired by the Government of India.
(iii) Delivery of 400 serviceable rifles.
(iv) Delivery of 50,000 rupees pending reference to Government, with
possibility of restoration in the event of compliance with two
other conditions, or retention as a fine, as the Government misht
decide.
I submit that (i) and (ii) could hardly be considered onerous under any
circumstances.
As regards the 400 rifles the position was this. The recent incident had
demonstrated the fact that practically every adult in the town, except the
British Indians, was possessed of a rifle and cartridges, including the large
community (between 200 and 300) of Persian shopkeepers, who are supposed
to be men of peace and not to need them and whom the Residency Agent was
much surprised to find, for the first time, fully armed. It is undoubtedly these