"تقرير إداري عن المقيمية السياسية في الخليج العربي والوكالة السياسية في مسقط لسنة ١٨٩٦-١٨٩٧ (إدارة الخارجية رقم تسلسلي ٩٢). كلكتا: ونشر بمعرفة مكتب ملاحظ المطبعة الحكومية في الهند (كلكتا)، ١٨٩٧ وملاحق بالتقرير الإداري عن المقيمية السياسية بالخليج العربي والوكالة السياسية في مسقط لسنة ١٨٩٦-١٨٩٧" [و‎‎٢‎٢‎٤] (٣١/١٥)

RESIDENCY AND MASKA.T POLITICAL AGENCY FOR THE YEA.R 1896-97.
13
part ii.—administration report oe the maskat politi
cal agency eor the year 1893-97.
The past year was one of considerable importance to the Sultan, death by
violence having removed the bitterest
Political. . ,, i
opponent the rulers or Maskat have had
for the past 25 years.
Since the imposition of the punitive tax upon the Hinawi in August 1895,
Sheikh Saleh-bin-Ali al Harthi had used his best endeavours to turn this
circumstance to account. In May 1898, Saleh found his opportunity. The
Sultan, partly with a view to carrying out the wishes of the Government of
India in regard to the completion of the indemnity to British subjects for
losses incurred, within the period fixed, and which he considered impossible
upon the basis originally decided upon, and also partly with a view to reple
nishing his empty exchequer, decided to impose a tax upon the produce of
the Ghafiris as well as upon that already imposed upon the rebel Hinawi.
Saleh at once seized the opportunity thus offered him and effected a
coalition between the Beni Ruaheh (Hinawi) and a portion of the Beni Jabir
(Ghafiri), and proceeded to attack Seja which was held by the Beni Hadram
and by such of the Jabir as remained faithful to His Highness the Sultan. Saleh
himself, though upwards of 75 years of age, assumed command of the allied
tribes. During one of the petty skirmishes that ensued, a stray bullet
deprived the rebels of their leader, and ended the life of the bitterest and the
most able opponent of the ruling house. Had the Sultan at once seized the
opportunity the death of this famous leader gave him, and attacked the rebels,
there seems to be no doubt but that he would have been successful. Saleh
was killed early in September, and it was not until late in October that the
Sultan with a force of about 7,000 men left for the interior. As soon as the
Sultan heard of the opposition that would be raised against the increase in
taxation, he cancelled the orders imposing a tax upon the produce of the
Ghafiris, and he thus was able to detach the Beni Jabir from the coalition
consisting principally of the Beni Ruaheh. The long delay that took place
prior to a start enabled the Beni Ruaheh to overcome their first panic at the
loss of their leader, and they were accordingly in a position to oppose the
Sultan's advance. The difference between the opposing forces was that the
Beni Ruaheh were fighting for their homes, whereas the Sultan's troops were
mercenaries, who like most Omani Arabs show extreme valour so long as they
receive their pay and are not within striking distance of the enemy. As a
natural result of relying only upon such troops, the Sultan at the critical
moment was deserted by most of the Sheikhs who had, though really friendly to
the enemy, professed allegiance to His Highness, and he returned to Maskat,
without having accomplished anything beyond the expenditure of about
$60,000.
Owing to a dispute between two factions in Nakhl, there appeared to be
fears of an outbreak in that district in the month of June.
The Sultan accompanied by a few hundred men proceeded to the place
and was able to restore order without further trouble.
With the above exceptions, and the usual petty intertribal disputes
which appear to be a necessity of existence in Oman, the country was not
in a disturbed state during the year under report.
At the close of the previous year, the Sultan's rule had ceased in Dhofar,
although the Shanafareh were favourable
Dhofar. t0 llim ° and Merbat was still garrisoned
by His Highness' men.