الملف E/8 I ابن سعود [ظ‎‎٧‎٨] (٦٠٦/١٦٩)

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No. 24, dated Buslure, the 4tli (received the 12th) January 1914.
From— J. G. L obimeb , Esq., C .I .E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
rp 0 ijjjg Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Delhi.
In continuation of my predecessor's letter No. 4005-M. of 2nd December 1913,
I have the honour to submit a Report by
No. T.-805, dated the 20th December 1913. Major Trevor, Political Agent, Bahrain.
2. In forwarding this report to the Government of India, I would remark
that our position between Bin Saud and the 1 orte is somewhat G-ifhcult. On ihe
one hand we have recognised as belonging to Turkey the province of Hasa, which
Bin Saud at present governs as an independent ruler, and which he wishes to retain.
On the other hand, it would be imprudent to shape our action on the assumption
that Bin Sand's retention of Hasa will be permanent or indeed more than tempo
rary. At the same time it is impossible, rfegard being had to the local interests
of British subjects and proteges, that we should continue to treat Hasa as a region
politically derelict and having no administrative head with whom we can deal in
matters affecting British subjects.
3. Every free bargain has two sides and must contain, if it is to be accepted,
some element of advantage to bo.th parties. _ With due regard to this principle
a mutual arrangement seems not impossible, in regard to certain points, between
ourselves and Bin Saud ; but in respect of the practicability of an accommodation
between Bin Saud and the Turks, and the outlook is less promising.
4. Bin Saud is willing that British subjects should reside and do business in
Hasa. He would protect them and would, in practice at least, recognise our
right to represent their interests. It appears to me that, if our subjects who are
desirous of trading in Hasa take advantage of his present disposition, a valuable
point will have been gained by us, and that Bin Saud will himself benefit, and
will be conscious of benefiting, by the mere fact that subjects of cure whom we
trust him to protect reside in his territory. He cannot but be aware that he lays
us under an obligation by encouraging them and that we on our part will seek every
means of maintaining a situation more favourable to our people than that which
existed under the Turkish regime. British subjects who are desirous of
proceeding to Hasa are now being permitted to do so, and 1 am authorising the
Political Agent in Bahrain to enter into such correspondence with Bin Saud as
their concerns may hereafter necessitate. In this way, perhaps, one part of the
Bin Saud problem will be solved without further discussion, and in a manner making
it difficult for the Turks, should they subsequently reoccupy Hasa, to resume
their former attitude to British subjects there. To consolidate the position, 1
I recommend that a Native Agent be at once posted to Katif to act as medium
of communication between the Political Agent in Bahrain and Bin Saud's local
governors. The Turks could hardly obtain the removal of this agent if, on recover
ing Hasa, they found him holding an established position in the province.
5. Other matters which, it seems to me, might be settled directly with Bin
Saud at the present time are that of his relations with the Shaikhs of Katar and
Trucial Oman and that of the control of refugees from his authority who settle
under their protection.
These questions arise from Bin Saud's own position as an Arab Chief and do not
concern the Turks. It might be arranged with Bin Saud, on condition of his not
entering the territory of the said Shaikhs without our consent, that we should use
our influence to induce them to restrain or expel refugees whose conduct in their
chosen places of residence was shown to be injurious to Bin Saud's legitimate
interests. A reciprocal arrangement of this nature should now, I venture to thimc,
be proposed to Bin Saud through the Political Agent in Bahrain.
6. The crux of the present negotiations is Bin Saud's virtual request that we
should intervene between him and the Turks in order to secure to him the govern
ment of the province of Hasa on an assured, autonomous, and probably hereditary
basis. Here it seems to me that, the views of the Porte and of Bin Saud being
at bottom irreconcileable, there is small prospect of our interposing with success,
and that we should, therefore, in the interests of good relations both between our
selves and him and between ourselves and the Turks, not be too forward in our inter
position. Bin Saud is, from the Turkish point of view, a very recent and oni}