"ملخص الأوراق الخاصة بنقل التحكم في العمليات في بلاد الرافدين من مكتب الهند إلى مكتب الحرب البريطاني" [و‎‎٦] (١٨/١١)

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For such results it Is well worthwhile to surrender control even if that surrender
should prove to be more real and less nominal than I anticipate.
It is the Secretary of State folk India who makes the real surrender of power
and responsibility. He welcomes the new system, and so 1 think may we..
Mr. Chamberlain is entirely right in saying that the result will be more efficient
co-operation and better support from home.
There are, of course, a few points on which we must guard ourselves. We
want to kno^, for instance, which authority is to make the higher appointments
referred to in (3). Again, as regards (8), we must retain the right to alttr
or even suppress War Office communiques whenever necessary. It is seldom
that a communique as worded and issued in London is suitable for the press in
India. As regards (9), it is no doubt intended that the communication of
intelligence between India and the War Office shall be reciprocal as it is at
present.
I think we may assure the Secretary of State that we will whole-heartedly
accept the new arrangement and carry it out with all good-will and in no grudg
ing spirit.
1 have also considered what effect the change will have on Your Excellency 's
position. In purely military affairs, 1 think, there will be none. i here will,
however, be a certain danger th?t your political control in Mesopotamia, in
Persia and in the Gulf may be weakened, and 1 would suggest that, in your reply,
Your Excellency should ask for assurances on this point, for though I can very
well carry on military operations under the general direction of the Chief of the
ImperiafGeneral Staff, the Viceroy cannot well receive political instructions
through that channel. I do not say that any attempt in this direction would
be made—indeed 1 do not think it would be—but nevertheless I think a clear
understanding on the point essential. Clause (5) telegram is not quite
sufficient, since, if read literally, it covers only internal India.
I also feel bound to bring to Your Excellency's notice that the new procedure
may possibly lead to some weakening of the financial control of the Government
of India, since the orders I shall receive from home and which will be binding on
me may involve expenditure- I do not see how this can be provided against,
but the danger is not a serious one, since in the main the class of expenditure to
which I refer, would, under existing agreements, fall on the Treasury and not
on India, and the^e agreements are under (7) of the telegram to remain
unchanged.
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Telegram P , No. I82, dated 9th Feb. uary I9I6.
From—His Excellency the Viceroy (Army Department).
To—The Secretary of State for India.
Private. —Control of military operations in Mesopotamia. Please see
your private telegram of February 3rd. {Serial No, /).
1 have consulted the Commander-in-Chief, and we wish to assure you that
we whole-heartedly accept the new arrangement and will carry it out with all
good will and in no grudging spirit.
There are one or two points which require elucidation and possibly amend-
me t.
For instance, it is not clear which authority is to make the higher appoint
ments referred to in section 3.
Section 5 applies only to India, but I think it is very desirable that, apart
from Mesopotamia, the political control of the Viceroy in Persia and the Gulf
should not be weakened.