"تقرير عسكري عن جنوب غرب بلاد فارس، يتضمن أقاليم خوزستان (عربستان)، لورستان، وجزءًا من فارس" [‎١‎٧‎٣] (٤٦٦/١٦٨)

173
Thus has the jealousy of the powers and the rivalry between speculators
of different nationalities proved inimical to commercial enterprise.
Were British interests once firmly placed in South-West Persia by the
opening- up of the Karun to Shustar, our just rule would work its own accept
ance and g-ain the confidence of all Persians, with the exception of their rulers,
whose interests lie in fostering the present untenable state of affairs. To put
off sowing the seed of prosperity and reform under the idea that wh^n we find
it necessary to do so we can plant the grown tree and at once reap its fruit is
a policy that will not bear a deep investigation, for that it will succeed is as
likely as that the fruit will be plucked.
Considering now .generally the necessity of developing railway enterprise
. in Persia, such projects only should be supported as shall
€ncour^ a ed. Pr0 ' ieCfcS t0 6 f 0 ™ 1 cither part of the future line of railway communi
cation between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf,
or serve as branches to it.
The projects advocated are—
(i) Euphrates Valley route.
(ii) From Constantinople via Tabriz, Tehran, Mashad, and Herat, or via
Isfahan and Karman and along the shore of the Gulf.
The course of events appears to indicate that it may run through Nushki,
Seistan, Karman,* Isfahan, Burujird, Karmanshah, Baghdad, and thence by
one or other of the proposed Euphrates Valley routes, to that point on the Syrian
coast affording the most commodious harbour, and at the same time accessible
Overland route to from the east. For strategic reasons a line to the south
llldia - ^ of the Euphrates is to be preferred. The physical fea
tures of Baluchistan, Persia, and Turkish Arabia are favourable to the cons
truction of the line as above projected; and this is the line, it is submitted,
the British Government should favour, it being capable of being controlled
throughout. Any line passing through Tehran would be completely under
Russian influence, her territory to the north, north-east, and even east of Persia
altogether commanding it.
Such a Grand Trunk system at Quetta communicates with the net-work
of Indian railways, and with branch lines to Kandahar and Kabul, to Tehran
and Muhammerah, it would tap the trade of Central Asia and Persia, and
immensely develop the resources of the latter country and of Baluchistan.
To carry the line further north would be to unnecessarily subject it to both
greater physical difficulties of country and to insurmountable political ones ; to
take it further south would be a commercial blunder, and gain nothing in cost
of construction or in point of security, for it has been shown that that power
will command it who holds the greater influence in South-West Persia.
Persia, taken as a whole, is the most sparcely populated country in the world,
and its inhabitants move little it is, however, capable of immense development,
and a central line, uniting the populous and commercial centres of Mid Persia,
is better calculated to develop the greatest area than one running along either
its northern or southern extremities, even if the physical features of the
country did not point to it as the natural line to be adopted.
The scheme to construct a line from Muhammerah via Shustar to Tehran
falls in with this general requirement, and enables Persia to trade in the mean
time with the whole world independently of foreign control, and agreeably
to her own idiosyncrasies.
Th */ sfall f n ' Y ^ zd > Karman, Fars, and Karmanshah are the chief opium-growing districts.
S ! nt t0 be Prepared for theChi na {see page 225). Yazd
60,000 L 70 000 ' Karman, 41,000 Kurmanshah, 30,000; Hamadan, 30,000; Isfahan,