"ملف 8/15 سلسلة الجزيرة العربية - ١٩٣٣-١٩٣٩" [ظ‎‎١‎٤‎٨] (٤٣٤/٢٩٦)

69
would piovide some money out of general revenues. Since there is a consi
derable loss on the Palestine and Trans-Jordan sections, those Govern
ments could reasonably say that they have already done their share in res
pect of the Railway by keeping the line open in their own territories and
incurring a loss in so doing. There seems to be little likelihood of either
Palestine, Syria or Trans-Jordan contributing anything towards the
scheme, save that Trans-Jordan might undertake some responsibility in
respect of the small section in its own territory, if the whole scheme were
adopted.
It seems to be equally unlikely that the Saudi Government will find
the money at the present time. There appears to be no chance that the
line will be a paying proposition, and one can hardly see the Saudi Gov
ernment, which is notoriously short of money, providing £150,000 on which
they would get no return.
The unattractive commercial possibilities in turn seem to make it most
unlikely that any private syndicate would undertake the work.
It therefore appears that the only possible way of raising the money is
that His Majesty’s Government should provide it. They certainly could
not justifiably provide it on the grounds of the scheme’s commercial attrac- ^
tions, but it is conceivable that it might be possible to justify the expendi
ture on political grounds. The Railway was destroyed during the Great
War and it might be argued that, having regard to the history of its
destruction and to its general interest to the Moslem world, and as a
gesture to the Moslem world, His Majesty’s Government should undertake
to repair it. Such a gesture might have considerable advantages at the
present time. It would show the Arabs that we are very much interested
in their welfare and it might be a means of counteracting the spread of
Italian influence in that area.
It may finally be worth consideration, whether the Railway could be
regarded as of possible strategic value to His Majesty’s Government. In
the event of a war with Italy, if Saudi Arabia threw in their lot with us,
it might conceivably be a link in an alternative route to the Suez Canal.
Do you think in the circumstances that there is a case on general political
grounds for His Majesty’s Government undertaking to pay the cost of re
pairing the Railway? If you think that there is a case, the next step
would presumably be to bring the Treasury into consultation on the
matter. If, on the other hand, you consider that there is no case, it is
probably a waste of time to pursue the matter further as it seems extremely
unlikely that any other source will assist to a sufficient extent to enable the
money to be raised. The Railway has remained derelict for the last fifteen
years without causing any great disturbance in the Moslem world and
presumably it can remain derelict for a further period without any un
toward results. As time goes on, the need for the Railway will probably
become steadily less, since pilgrims will tend to go to Mecca more and more
by motor routes. ^
Copies of this letter and the enclosure are being sent to the War Office,
Air Ministry, India Office, and Treasury.
Letter from the High Commissioner for Palestine to the Colonial
Office, No. T. C./69/35, dated 12th May 1936.
1 have the honour to refer to your Confidential despatch of the lOtfi
d anuary, 1936, regarding the conference held at Haifa in October, 1935,
on the subject of the reconditioning of the Hejaz Railway.
2 Of the conclusions reached by the conference on the five points which
formed the agenda, I have no comment to make on Nos. 1, 2, 4, and 5, save
to endorse the recommendations of the conference.
3. As regards the third point, namely the manner in which the
expenses necessary for the reconditioning of the line are to be met, I would
observe that I am unable to endorse the recommendation of the Saudi re
presentative, Fuad Bey Hamza, that the reconditioning of the damaged