"ملف 8/15 سلسلة الجزيرة العربية - ١٩٣٣-١٩٣٩" [ظ‎‎١‎٥‎٠] (٤٣٤/٣٠٠)

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4. All this of course is rather outside your immediate sphere, but I
thought it might be useful to you to know that the establishment of the
North Western terminal of the Saudi-Iraqi frontier at the true summit
of the Jebel Anaiza and not at the geographical point mentioned
as a supplementary definition in the Protocol of Uqair will be very definitely
to our advantage, and very helpful to us in our negotiations with the Saudi
Government about the Transjordan frontier.
5. As regards the neutral zone, the matter seems to be entirely one
for the Saudis and Iraqis to settle between themselves, but our experience
here, generally speaking, has been that neutral zones are an unmitigated
nuisance, and that if they could be got rid of the situation is likely to be
considerably simplified. They have in particular given us a great deal of
trouble in connexion with recent negotiations for oil concessions in Arabia.
6 . As regards extradition I was under the impression that the settle
ment arrived at in Mecca in April, 1931, had been found to offer a very
satisfactory solution of existing difficulties. I am not sure whether we
are called upon to advise further in regard to it, but the Treaty Depart
ment generally have rather strong views on extradition questions, and if you
are in any doubt therefore you may like to send us a separate despatch on
the point.
Letter from the British Embassy, Baghdad, to the Foreign Office,
No. 17/27/36, dated the 20th February 1936.
With reference to my despatch No. 89 of February 17th, about the
Iraqi Government’s negotiations with Saudi Araoia, I enclose a copy of a
note prepared by Edmonds for his minister on tne Iraqi—Saudi Arabia
boundary and the neutral zone.
In his covering letter Edmonds writes that he thinks that the Saudi
proposals for the bisection of the neutral zone and the demarcation of the
frontiers are not likely to be pressed, but that importance is attached by
the Saudi delegation to the Dahamshah dispute and to the amendment of
the extradition agreement. Both of these are hardy annuals carefully cul
tivated by Ibn Saud. They are, however, solely the concern of the Iraqi
and Saudi Governments and I need not bother you with details.
I learn from Yassin Pasha that the revival of these stale and antiquated
differences has rather overcast the dawn of a new Arabian brotherhood
which some optimists saw on the horizon and, in consequence, the treaty
of alliance is being extensively redrafted.
I gather that Yassin has done some plain speaking to Yusuf Yasin and
has told him franklv that Saudi Arabia clearly cannot help Iraq effectively
in any circumstances until she becomes more civilised and that, on the other
hand, he must not imagine that Iraq will allow herself to be drawn willy- ^
niily into any complications m which King Abdul Aziz may become involved
with states either members or non-members of the League.
Yusuf Yasin apparently asked wfiat Iraq would do if Saudi Arabia
were to go to war with Great Britain; Yassin just told him not to be silly.
SAUDI IRAQ NEGOTIATIONS : NOTE NO. 4.
The Boundary. )
1 . Shaikh Yusuf A1 Yasin has proposed :
{a) that the Neutral Zone shall be divided between the two States;
(b) that the boundary shall be demarcated.
2. The relevant article in the Treaty of Muhammara reads as follows :—
According to Article 1 (a) the Muntafiq, Dhafir and Amarat tribes
belong to Iraq, similarly the Shammar Nejd belong to Nejd.
The wells and lands used from 014 times by the Iraq tribes