"ملف 8/15 سلسلة الجزيرة العربية - ١٩٣٣-١٩٣٩" [و‎‎١‎٦‎٢] (٤٣٤/٣٢٣)

3. From the 1933 despatch quoted above it will be seen that whereas
Abha had only an old Telefunken set, there was at Riyadh a new Marconi
station of six kilowatts.
4. Copies of this despatch are being sent to the Department of Overseas
Trade, Baghdad, Bushire and Jerusalem.
(ii)
(Received on 8th February 1937 with Political Secretary's letter No. 3, dated
21st January 1937.)
Enclosure in Foreign Office covering letter, dated 18th January 1937.
Letter from the Residency, Cairo, to the Right Hon’ble Anthony
Eden, No. 1385, dated 18th December 1936.
Since my despatch No. 1383 of December 17th was written, I have re
ceived your despatch No. 1155 (E 7344/2617/91) enclosing a record of a con
versation between the Saudi Minister in London and Mr. Rendel on November
23rd.
2 . I have read this report with especial interest seeing that it very much
bears out the train of ideas elaborated in my despatch under reference. The
information in King Ibn Saud’s possession clearly confirms what we have
heard from other independent sources, namely an intensification of Italian
intrigue in the Yemen.
3. I have never disguised the extreme gravity with which I view the situa
tion that is apparently now developing. At great pains we have been elabo
rating with Egypt arrangements for the safeguarding of the Suez Canal as
an essential link in our Imperial Communications. I trust I am in error
in fearing that those communications risk being blocked by Italy at the other
(southern) end of the Red Sea.
4. Viewed from that angle, the present overture of King Ibn Saud through
his Minister as recorded in Mr. Renders note strikes me as being of the highest
potential importance : and I most earnestly trust that it be not lightly turned
down or ignored. Ibn Saud, who is a particularly powerful character and the
dominant factor in Arab politics to-day, is doubtless acting mainly through
motives of self-interest: so indeed are we. But it seems to me clear from
what the Saudi Minister said that Ibn Saud fears that the Italians, having
gained the domination—if not indeed the annexation—of the Yemen will
next turn their attention to the neighbouring Hedjaz and other contiguous
Saudi territory. Clearly it is one thing to have the Imam as a neighbour :
it is quite another to have the Italians.
5. I have long felt convinced that we are approaching the parting of
the ways with Italy, who, having annexed Abyssinia was certain sooner
or later—and probably sooner than later—to try and do the same thing
across the Red Sea in the Yemen. I am more convinced than ever that that
is her aim and ambition. If I am correct—and I believe I am—there seems
to me only two alternatives : (a) some arrangement with Italy that will de
finitely check her expansion at the Southern end of the Red Sea and prevent
this threat to our interests ; (b) a trial of strength with Great Britain to ensure
that such expansion does not take place.
6 . I am well aware of the present conversations between London and
Rome with a view to a “ detente ” in our relations. And I trust I may nof
be considered out of order or an alarmist if, nonetheless, I formally record
my doubt whether any understanding with Italy in her present mood of
cocksureness is going to achieve what we want, or put an end to the growing
threat to the safety of our communications at the Southern end of the Red
Sea, coupled with the safety of Perim and our possession of Aden.
7. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty’s Minister at Jedda>
to the Chief Commissioner and Resident and Commander-in-Chief, Aden,
and to the Governor-General of the Sudan.
45(C ExAffairaDept