"ملف 8/15 سلسلة الجزيرة العربية - ١٩٣٣-١٩٣٩" [و‎‎١‎٧‎٥] (٤٣٤/٣٤٩)

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alarmed by the Zionist policy. They feared that a Jewish Government
would be established in Palestine and would include Transjordan in its scope,
and they were even beginning to fear that there might be designs on Medina
itself, the burial-place of the Prophet Mahomed. Some of these fears might
be exaggerated, and due to irresponsible talk by individual Jews, but there was
also genuine ground for apprehension, and he himself was very anxious about
the question. Great Britain was powerful and could crush the Arab opposi
tion, but he feared that there might be dangerous repercussions in other
Moslem countries in which His Majesty’s Government had special interests,
e.g., Egypt, Iraq and India. There were many enemies watching for an
opportunity to injure Great Britain. The chief of these was, of course, Italy.
The attempt that Italy was making to win recognition as the friend of Moslems
in general and of the Arabs in particular was well known. The Italians
had used the pilgrimage for propaganda purposes, and had done their best to
induce him to speak in praise of their pro-Moslem policy. He had resisted
this attempt, and he had no belief whatever in Italian professions, for he
knew what had happened in Tripoli and in Abyssinia, but there w^as a real
0 ^ danger from the Italians, nevertheless, if the troubles in Palestine should
^ flare up again. Nor were the Turks inactive. They had many agents in
Palestine, who never failed to rub it into the Arabs that the result of their
revolt against the Turks was subordination to the Jew T s. The Zionist policy,
as it was being carried out at present, was contrary to British interests, and
that was one reason why he was against it. As a Moslem and an Arab he
naturally sympathised with the Arabs of Palestine. He had suppressed
these personal feelings hitherto out of friendship for His Majesty’s Govern
ment, and he could always suppress his feelings if policy required it. But
the Zionist policy was not even in the interests of Great Britain. Moreover,
His Majesty’s Government must realise that he stood alone, and that he had
to think of his position in a Moslem world where he was the butt of much
criticism, and where many of his co-religionists would not even admit that
he was a Moslem. He felt that he had come to the end of what he could do
in the matter of Palestime.
22 . His Majesty was assured that his views would be communicated to
His Majesty’s Government without delay.
23. Ibn Saud said that he had one last question. Suppose that there
was trouble in the Yemen and the Italians asked him about it, as they might
very well do ; what should he say ? Should he reply to this effect:—
He did not propose to interfere in the internal affairs of the Yemen,
and the Rome understanding of 1927, the relevant part of which
had been communicated to him by the Italians as well as by the British,
seemed to require them both to adopt a similar attitude of non-inter
vention.
Mr. Rend el said that this reply seemed to meet the circumstances exactly.
*
( 26 )
Enclosure in Foreign Office covering letter dated 30th April 1937.
Letter from Minister, Jedda, to Foreign Office , No. 44, dated the
12th April 1937.
Jedda, March 25, 1937,
In the summary of conversations with IbTh Saud which I had the honour
to submit as an enclosure to my despatch No. 41, dated the 23rd March, the
question of the Yemen was referred to in paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 23. I now
transmit a summary of the document which the King handed to me when we
were dealing with this subject. The document is a multigraphed copy of a
typewritten original in Arabic, in the form of an open letter to the Imam.
I understood from Ibn Saud that the letter had been distributed widely in the
Yemen. It urges the Imam to designate his son Husain as his successor,