"ملف 8/15 سلسلة الجزيرة العربية - ١٩٣٣-١٩٣٩" [و‎‎١‎٧‎٨] (٤٣٤/٣٥٥)

49
itself on the Arabian coast of the Red Sea. We had meticulously observed
our own part of this Understanding, even to the extent of holding aloof in
cases where we might have obtained a dominant position for ourselves in
matters connected with Saudi Arabia. I hoped that the Italian Government
would be equally scrupulous in keeping to their part of the Understanding,
but I felt bound to say that the words and actions of certain Italians had done
much to lend colour to the doubts which were felt in certain quarters here
as to the ultimate intentions of Italy in regard to the Yemen. Our own policy
was, however, perfectly clear and simple. We desired to see the independent
Arab States remain independent and strong. We had no desire whatever to
extend our influence beyond those limited spheres in Arabia in which we were
legally entitled to exercise it, and any rumours to the contrary were merely
malicious inventions.
5. As regards the particular cases to which Signor Crolla had alluded*
I could tell him quite frankly what had been the object of Sir R. Bullard’s
journey. As Signor Crolla knew, we were faced with an extremely difficult
problem in Palestine resulting from our conflicting obligations. The Royal
Commission had now produced a Report and recomendations, which might
^ well arouse strong feelings on both sides. We had felt it essential to ensure
4? that the Commission’s Report and recommendations should be clearly under
stood by the leading personalities in the Arab world, and that there should
be no risk of unnecessary misunderstanding owing to incomplete or inaccurate
information. We had therefore decided to send Sir R. Bullard to Riyadh to
explain the Report and recommendations of the Commission and the con
clusions of His Majesty’s Government thereon frankly and accurately to King
Ibn Saud the day before those documents were published in this country.
This had involved Sir R. Bullard reaching Riyadh with the Report and con
clusions of His Majesty’s Government not later than July 6th, and, seeing that
the Report had not been in our hands until the evening of June 22nd, it had
not been physically possible to arrange this without sending the necessary
documents to him by air. I had myself been responsible for the proposal
to send the two aircraft to Jedda, and had only hit upon this way of sending the
papers to Sir R. Bullard after I had found that all the other methods of com
munication would have been too slow. It was quite possible that Sir R.
Bullard might take the opportunity of his visit to Riyadh to discuss any other
outstanding matters with the King, but the object of his journey was perfect
ly simple and straightforward, and it was absurd to read deep ulterior politi
cal motives into it, or to represent it as implying any change of policy on
our part.
6. As regards what Signor Crolla had said about our adopting a forward
policy in the hinterland of the Hadhramaut and extending our authority
round to the back of the Yemen, this was equally off the rails. There had
been no question whatever of our extending our authority in this area. The
boundaries of the Aden Protectorate dated from before the war, and from the
days of the Anglo-Turkish Conventions about Aden of 1905 and 1914. This
^ applied also to the Arab States under British protection on the Arab coast
R of the Persian Gulf, to which Signor Crolla had made an allusion. The
legal boundaries of our sphere of influence both in the case of the Aden
Protectorate and in that of our Arab protected States on the Persian Gulf
were laid down in the two Anglo-Turkish Conventions of July 29th, 1913
[S. E. Dec. 1903, Nos. 1-245] and March 9th, 1914 [S. E. June 1914, Nos. Ti
ll 5], and the relevant article was Article 3 of the latter Convention, which
laid down the so-called blue and violet Unes. This Convention had been pub
lished in Volume XI of Aitchison’s Treaties (1933 Edition, Volume XI, page
42). The legal position was still governed by it, and as regards the north-west
frontier of the Aden Protectorate, the frontier had been confirmed by the
Anglo-Yemeni Treaty of 1934 (Gmd 4630), Article 3 of which provided for the
maintenance of the existing frontier. There had never been any question
whatever of our extending our influence beyond this line, and the last thing
we should contemplate doing was to penetrate beyond it and adopt a forward
territorial policy in spheres in respect of which we had no legal claim. As
regards the Aden Protectorate, which legally extended up to the “ violet
line ” to the north-west, and up to a line running inland from Ras Dharbat