"ملف 8/15 سلسلة الجزيرة العربية - ١٩٣٣-١٩٣٩" [و‎‎١‎٩‎١] (٤٣٤/٣٨١)

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father more about what was likely to happen over the proposed general con
versations in Rome. If these conversations took place, it might be conve
nient, just before they started, to have a talk about the present question ;
but if they were for any reason delayed, I doubted whether much would be
gained by a preliminary discussion at this end of this particular question in
isolation.
3. Signor Crolla then said that he thought perhaps the best thing to do
would be to show me the draft of an informal communication which he had
prepared, stating the Italian point of view. This was a kind of aide memoire,
in Italian only, which he said he could not leave with me but which he would
like me to read.
4. I went through this document with him. Its main thesis was that
the Rome Understanding of 1927 applied not only to the Red Sea area but to
Southern Arabia as a whole. It represented that it was an essential prin
ciple of the Rome Understanding that the status quo existing at the time of
its signature should not be modified except by agreement and in consulta
tion with the Italian Government. The Italian Government at that time
had known nothing of our claims over what we now called the northern and
eastern areas of the Aden Protectorate, i.e. the Hadramaut, Shehr, Mokalla,
etc., and they could only regard our new “ forward ” policy in this area—
which in their view had the effect of adding some 40,000 square miles to the
Aden Protectorate—as an annexation of territory in violation of the Rome
Understanding. This contention was supported in the draft by a number
of extremely flimsy arguments, several of which I was able to controvert
immediately, though Signor Crolla naturally professed not to be convinced.
The draft aide memoire was accompanied by a draft annex giving specific
instances of our alleged forward policy.
5. I told Signor Crolla that it was obvious from the text of the Rome
Understanding itself that that Understanding was not intended to refer to
any of the areas in Arabia which were under our protection. Had it been
intended to deal with this part of Arabia those areas would, of course, have
been mentioned. But there was no mention even of the Aden Protectorate
in the agreement, although the existence of the Protectorate and our interest
in it was of course well known and generally accepted at the time. I presum
ed that the Italian Government were not trying to challenge our position at
Aden, although the argument developed in Signor Crolla’s draft could be read
as an attempt to do so.
6. Signor Crolla admitted that the Rome Understanding could not be
regarded as in any way interfering with our rights in the Aden Protectorate,
but he repeated that the Protectorate, as then understood by the Italian
Government, was a much smaller area than what we now claimed, and again
urged, in support of this contention, that it had always been so shown on ail
published maps etc. Seeing an atlas on my table, he suggested that we
should look it up in proof of his contention. The atlas was Stieler’s Hand-
atlas, 1921 edition, and contained an excellent map of Arabia, on which, to
Signor Crolla’s discomfiture, practically the whole of the southern coast of
Arabia turned out to be marked red, as a British possession. (This was a
piece of luck, for I fear that Signor Crolla is on stronger ground on this parti
cular point even than he thinks, since there are many old official publica
tions—including, I believe, India Office and Colonial Office lists—describing
the Protectorate as a very much smaller area than what we now claim.)
Signor Crolla again emphasised that what the Italians complained of was not
our established rights in the Aden Protectorate but what he described as our
attempt to extend the boundaries of the Protectorate for something like 500
miles to the east and for a great distance into the hinterland.
I explained to Signor Crolla that there had been no. change whatever
in the political situation. Our sphere, as I had explained to him before, was
bounded by the Anglo-Turkish boundaries of 1914. There had never been
the slightest question of our extending our influence beyond that sphere,
which had been our sphere since long before the War. But within it we had
always claimed special rights. Our position in the south eastern corner of
the Aden Protectorate rested on a number of ancient treaties with the local
chiefs. Identical treaties existed with the chiefs in the area now being
brought under closer administrative control. Whatever arbitrary distinc
tion unofficial maps might have shown between the south western and the
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