"ملف 8/15 سلسلة الجزيرة العربية - ١٩٣٣-١٩٣٩" [ظ‎‎٢‎٠‎٨] (٤٣٤/٤١٦)

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of the belief that, if a serious revolt broke out in Transjordan, it would
attract the spontaneous participation of the Saudi tribes on the border, and
when once the movement had begun Ibn Saud would have to allow it to con
tinue or perhaps even to take part in it.
3. There is no doubt that at present Ibn Saud does not want anything
of the sort to happen. If he had not been really attached to the view which
he has professed on several occasions during the last eighteen months, viz.,
that his interests and those of His Majesty’s Government are identical, he
would hardly have acted as he has done in regard to Palestine. The import
ant question is how far he will continue to adhere to that view if there
is no radical change in the Palestine policy of His Majesty’s Government.
1 have recently recorded my opinion that he continues to support His
Majesty’s Government as far as he can because he cannot believe that in the
long run they will carry out a policy grossly unjust (from his point of view)
to the Arabs, and that his strong professions of friendship must not be
regarded as a blank cheque. He has recently pointed out that his help in
bringing about a restoration of order in Palestine so that the Royal Com
mission could carry out its work, and later in inducing the Palestine Arabs
to give evidence, resulted in disappointment for the Arabs, and has said
that while he is ready to assist in bringing about an atmosphere in which the
technical commission can begin its labours he cannot this time take the
initiative. In fact, he assisted His Majesty’s Government and the Arabs
got nothing out of it (again from their point of view, and his), and whereas
last time he gave his assistance because of his general belief in the “justice”
of His Majesty’s Government, he cannot afford to do that again. Of course,
it may be that His Majesty’s Government have no further need of his good
offices. I am not assuming that they are necessary to His Majesty’s Gov
ernment, but am merely using the history of Ibn Baud’s attitude on the point
to show that his position seems to have become more difficult
ru o aS seems . ^ V ident, the Palestine question has gradually forced
Ibn baud i^to a position where he cannot be as helpful as he would like to
be to His Majesty’s Government, can it be guaranteed that, if the situation
does not soon turn more to the advantage of the Arabs, he will not be obliged
to tecome I es s and less friendly ? I would not give any such guarantee, fnd
I thinlc it would be a mistake to trade too far upon his wish to maintain
the ^riendhest relations with His Majesty’s Government. What will con
stitute in Arab eyes a favourable turn is a difficult problem, but I fear that
no scheme which does not call a final halt to Jewish expansion in Palestine
in some way or other will have a chance of acceptance by the Arabs. I must
admit that I myself favoured partition as a solution even before the Roval
Commission began its work, as placing a limit on Jewish expansion in "the
most definite way Whether the suggested scheme of partition would have
aroused less hostility among the Arabs if the reservations made in the
despatch of the 23rd December, 1937, had appeared in the Statement of
1 diicy in July is an academic question, but of the strength of the hostility
now there is no doubt. The mam difficulty is perhaps the complete dm
belief which Arab spokesmen profess to have in the ability of His Maiesty’s
Government to keep the Jews within any limits which may be fixed Ibn
Saud does not go so far as to say that His Majesty’s Government are under
the thumb of the Jew, but he has expressed a vehement surprise at what
he considers the unnatural and, indeed, irreligious combination of the Jews
with His Majesty s Government And the religious factor has great in-
fluence with him, both because of his personal convictions and of his vulne
rabihty to criticism, both at home and abroad, on this score
5. These remarks have grown out of what may well seem the foolish
vapourings of a pan-Arab visionary of no influence. I do not share th^
view that the flight of six Saudi aeroplanes along the border would suffice
to cause a revolt m Transjordan, but the suggestion that a revolt in Tran,
Jordan might attract Saud, tribes and eventually win the acquiescence if
not the support of Ibn Saud, is not necessarily to be scouted forever because
we can scout it for the moment. ■ ause