"بلوشستان وبلاد فارس. مذكرة كتبها السير دينيس فيتزباتريك" [و‎‎٣] (٢٤/٥)

charges which India would have to hear in the event of a Hussion invasion
in defending herself on the Indian side and in Afghanistan, I say I think,
having regard to all this, it might very fairly he argued that the cost of any
auxiliary measures to he undertaken from the Persian side, whether in the
tract now under consideration or elsewhere, should be borne by Imperial
revenues. I will, however, for argument sake, assume that the interest to
which I am now referring is to be treated as wholly Indian. But assuming
this it is necessary, in order to get some idea of what contribution India ought
to make in respect of that interest, that we should consider what the extent
of that interest really is. I would put the question thus. Seeing that the
Russian railway is already at Kushk, only 80 miles from Herat, and that
the materials for an extension to Herat are already there; seeing that
things in this respect are already almost as bad for us as they possibly can
be, would the presence of Russia in Seistan add so much to our difficulties
as to make it worth our while, in order to keep Russia out of Seistan, to
occupy the extensive and absolutely worthless country lying between us and
the Persian border, to spend there vast sums which would otherwise be
available for defensive measures on the Indian side of Afghanistan, and to
lock up there in the event of war considerable military forces which could
otherwise be employed elsewhere ? This is a question for military experts,
and I should like to know what their answer to it would be.
13. There remains the suggestion that if we can keep Russia out of
Seistan we may be able to get hold of it ourselves when the break-up comes,
and that if we further get possession of the valley of the Helmund we might
take the water of that river under control, bring it down to Seistan in canals,
and thus restore Seistan to what is said to have been its former position as
the granary of that part of the world. Now, the political, military, and
engineering questions arising out of that suggestion are altogether beyond
my province, but even if they were within it I should think it unnecessary to
go into them here. I should think it enough to say that India can take no part
in such a scheme. Even if we were to arrive at an understanding with
Russia, as Lord Curzon thinks we possibly might be able to do, by which
Seistan would fall within [the British sphere of influence, and subsequently
England acquired possession of that province, and Her Majesty’s Govern
ment were to oiler it to India as a free gift, with a view to her developing
its resources for her own profit, I think the offer should be declined. We
have quite enough, and far more than enough, on our hands without going
out there, and the scheme would be far too speculative a thing for the
guardians of the Indian revenues to look at.
14. Now, what is the practical conclusion to which I come ? It is this,—
We should not, from a reluctance to raise what are called “contentious
questions,” shut our eyes to the fact that what we have now under con
sideration is the first step in a momentous new departure—that we should
not confine ourselves to the particular Despatch on which orders are now
sought, but should look into all the papers available here, and should, before
going further, consider the whole scheme as it is sketched out in them,
obtaining the opinion of military experts on the military questions involved,
and the opinion of financial experts on the financial questions involved ;
and that we should endeavour to come to some understanding with the
Eoreign Office, not only as to the general nature of the programme to be
attempted, but also as to the way in which the cost of all measures which
are to be undertaken, whether in the country between Quetta and the
Persian border or elsewhere, should be apportioned between Indian revenues
on the one hand, and Imperial or other revenues on the other.
I think we should insist on a distribution of the cost by fixed shares and
not in the way lately suggested by the Government of India, which would
throw on Indian revenues the whole of the expenditure to be incurred in, or
in connection with, those very parts of Persia in which British influence is
to be pushed, and in, or in connection with, which before many years
expenditure may have to be incurred to an extent which it is impossible to
estimate. If we do not tackle this question now, I fear the result will be