"بلوشستان وبلاد فارس. مذكرة كتبها السير دينيس فيتزباتريك" [ظ‎‎١‎٠] (٢٤/٢٠)

‘2
to refer, “ the work of administration cannot be undertaken without an
extension of responsibility, which is not measured by the expenditure in
“ men and money necessary to keep internal order, but by other and far
“ reaching considerations of Imperial policy.”
3. The Baluchistan officers, I know, would not agree with this view.
They have always displayed an almost passionate desire to bring under their
administration every wild tract of country thdy can get hold of. They first
set to work on the southern portion of the great tract above referred to, and
pushed their interference to such an extent, that serious disturbances
resulted, and Lord Elgin’s Government had to interfere and isssue orders
insisting on the country being again placed in the hands of the local chiefs.
Whether those orders will stand remains to be seen. It may be that it will
be found impossible now to restore the pre-existing state of things, and I
suspect some people would he only too glad to find that it was impossible.
4. More recently attention has been directed to the northernmost portion of
the tract (the portion with which we now are immediately concerned), with
the result that in 1896 a proposal was submitted for opening a trade route
from Nushki to Koh-i-Malik-Siah in Seistan on the Persian border, and was
sanctioned by the Secretary of State in his letter of the 23rd of October 1896.
How if this trade route was to be regarded simply as a means of developing
trade, it might well be doubted whether it would be justifiable to invest
public money on a scheme so highly speculative. On the chances of this
scheme succeeding I do not pretend to pronounce an opinion. The matter
is one for consideration by men like Sir C. Bernard, who have made such
subjects their study; but I observe that there is a difference of opinion on
it among the local officers, and I can well understand this, for a trade route
across what is practically a desert, between termini about 450 miles apart,
and with no prospect of any traffic to speak of except the through traffic
between these termini does not seem a very hopeful sort of thing. I may
add that the form in which the statistics of traffic are submitted are not such
as to show how much of the traffic comprised in them really uses the new
route for any distance worth speaking of. Thus the statistics for 1898-99
show the value of the trade in round numbers as follows: —
Its.
Imports - 3,47,000
Exports ----- 3,81,000
Total - 7,28,000
but these figures include trade passing through Nushki to and from Afghan
istan and Kelat which apparently can come along the route only for a
distance not worth speaking of. It is impossible to make out from the
export tables how much of the exports go to Seistan; but I observe from the
import tables that of the Its. 3,47,000 total imports shown only Rs. 161,000,
or less than half, comes from Seistan.
5. It is candidly admitted in the correspondence that the thing is only
an experiment, and it is added in justification of it that we could easily
abandon it in the event of its not proving a success ; but we know, from our
experience in the Gomal and Wano, and in the Tochi, and, need I add, on
the Chitral road, that it is almost impossible to start a route and protect it
without getting mixed up with the affairs of the country it traverses to such
an extent as to make it impossible after a little time to come away.
6. The matter, however, does not rest there. If there was any chance of
our being able to withdraw in this case, we have cut it away by undertaking
to administer the country through which the route passes right up to the
borders of Persia. The country west of the Nushki Niabut, which, I under
stand, is not subject to the Khan of Kelat, we took possession of on our
own authority at the time we opened the route; and we have now completed
the arrangement by taking over in perpetuity from the Khan of Khelat the
Nushki Niabut, and, as the Government of India put it, practically annexing