"بلوشستان وبلاد فارس. مذكرة كتبها السير دينيس فيتزباتريك" [و‎‎١‎١] (٢٤/٢١)

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that country. This last step, I observe, was advocated by the Agent to the
Governor-General, on the ground that one result of it would be “ to give
“ us an unbroken belt of administered territory all along the Afghan border
“ from Domandi on the Gomal to Koh-i-Malik-Siah ” on the Persian
frontier—a thing which, as I have already explained, was scarcely contemplated
by those who started the Durand demarcation. We can, of course, if the
trade route proves a failure, reduce certain establishments we have sanctioned;
but I do not see how we could retire from the country we have annexed
unless indeed we were to do so at once before we are further committed.
7. But there is still something more. The measures to which I have just
been referring are really the prelude to more ambitious schemes. It has for
some years been urged that the vast tract lying between us and the Persian
border should be opened up by lines of railway, and various schemes have
been proposed and surveys and estimates made. The proposal of the late
Sir li. Sandeman, who was in correspondence witli Lord Curzon on the
subject, was that we should begin by making a railway from the sea, and
Sir William Lee-Warner, in his Memorandum on Mekran written a year
ago, held the same view, and proposed a railway starting from the sea and
running up to Nushki. Other authorities have given the preference to one
or other of several lines from Nushki to the west. It is one of these latter,
running from Nushki to Koh-i-Malik-Siah, that at this moment is most in
favour, and it has the support of many authorities, from Lord Salisbury
down to the energetic young officer now in charge of our new acquisition.
It is not, of course, proposed to start this project at once. Forward schemes
must he developed gradually, and the present moment is not a propitious
one for the discussion of them. Lord Curzon’s colleagues have thought it
best to reserve the consideration of all such projects for the present, and
Lord Curzon himself, who argues at considerable length in favour of this
Nushki-Seistan line, tells us that he would be prepared to let it stand over
indefinitely in the event of our being able to arrive at a certain under
standing with Bussia, of which it is enough here to say that the chance of
our being able to arrive at it seems to be of the very smallest.
8. Thus the construction of railways in the country between our frontier
and Persia is a matter which is not submitted for our consideration at this
moment, but, as it is the second step in a scheme, the first step in which is
now being sanctioned, and as all our recent troubles have been due chiefly
to our having been led on step by step without seeing whither we were
going, I think it well that we should consider what the result of our
constructing such railways would be. That such railways would not within
any time to which we can look forward pay anything like their working
expenses (to say nothing of interest on capital) is about as clear as anything
of the sort could be ; but there is something more serious than that to be
considered. If we were to leave the vast wilderness lying between us and
the Persian frontier in its present state, and if* it were possible (which,
however, now that we have assumed the administration, is by no means
likely) to leave it without troops, there would be no need to trouble
ourselves about it in the event of war with Russia, for there would be
nothing in it to tempt an invader. But if we were to construct railways,
then we should be compelled even in time of peace to establish military
stations to protect them, and in the event of war we should be com
pelled to reinforce those military stations up to whatever strength might
be necessary to enable them to hold their own against any force that might
he brought against them, and this, I may observe, applies with special force
to the case of a railway like the proposed Nushki Seistan line, which would
run along our border and close to it. We should thus, in the event of war,
he out there on the extreme left in a position somewhat similar to that in
which we should be in the country from the Malakand to Chitral on the
extreme right, and, both our flanks being thus immensely extended, our
centre, where all the really important work would have to be done, would
be correspondingly depleted.
9. It will be observed that I have been treating the scheme up to this as
if its only object, or its main object, was the introduction of some system of
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