"بلوشستان وبلاد فارس. مذكرة كتبها السير دينيس فيتزباتريك" [ظ‎‎١‎١] (٢٤/٢٢)

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administration in the wild tract which intervenes between us and Persia,
and the development of trade and the construction of railways there; and
if this were its main or only object, I should certainly oppose it; bat it is
impossible to look at the way in which the whole matter has been treated,
from first to last, without seeing that the paramount object aimed at is a
widely different one, and one which, it is at least conceivable, might justify
all that is proposed. The object to which I refer is that of checking Russia
in her advance towards Southern Persia, and primarily to Seistan, and
further of obtaining for ourselves, if possible,'a position in Seistan, when
Persia falls to pieces.
10. Now this is a matter which I am altogether incompetent to discuss.
I am quite unable to judge how far our starting a great trade and estab
lishing railway communication between India and Seistan would go towards
counteracting Russian influence in Seistan, or whether it is the most effectual
mode open to us of counteracting that influence. Again, I am not in a
position to form anything like a true estimate of the difference which
Russia’s being or not being in Seistan would make to the British Empire
generally, or to India in particular.
11. One danger I see that is apprehended from Russia getting hold of
Seistan is that she might work downwards from there, and get an outlet on
the sea, which is one of her chief objects. What I understand is feared is
not that she would creep down through the tract to which I have been
referring, for any attempt on her part to do that would of course give rise
to a casus belli, but that she would creep down through Persian territory.
Now, though there are other routes, and possibly more expeditious routes, by
which Russia might attempt to get down to the sea, I can perfectly well
understand that it might be expedient to resort even to elaborate and costly
measures to close the Seistan route to her. But what I desire particularly
and most strongly to insist on is that it is not merely Indian interests, but
also and far more Imperial interests that are involved here. I presume I am
right in thinking that the danger India would have most to fear in time of
trouble from Russian men-of-war in the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Sea
would be, not the danger to which she more than any other British
possession would be exposed, of attacks upon her coasts, as the danger to
which she, in common with the United Kingdom, and a very large proportion
of Her Majesty’s dominions abroad, would be exposed, of having her merchant
shipping attacked, on the high seas. If that is so, and if elaborate and
costly measures should in consequence have to be adopted to prevent Russia
getting down to the sea, it seems too obvious for argument that India should
not be called upon to bear more than a certain share of the cost of those
measures; and further that if Her Majesty’s Government, with whom the
decision of such questions must really rest, should determine that those
measures could be most effectually taken in a wild tract which is within
the sphere of influence of the Government of India, that circumstance ought
not to be allowed to make any difference in this respect. To call upon India
to pay the whole cost or anything at all like the whole cost in such cir
cumstances would be almost like asking our South African Colonies to bear
the cost of the present war, or even like calling on the ratepayers of
Portsmouth to defray the cost of the fortifications there. I think it the
more necessary to insist on this point, because it seems to me that people are
inclined to forget altogether that the state of things in which the Persian
question was exclusively or almost exclusively an Indian question has long
passed away.
12. I turn next to another danger which is apprehended from the Russians
getting hold of Seistan, namely, that they would thereby acquire an
additional position from which to attack Afghanistan; and here no doubt it
may with some show of reason be argued that the interest involved is wholly
Indian. I say no more than “ with some show of reason,” because I ‘think
it might well be contended on the other side, that seeing what India is to
England, and bearing in mind the terribly heavy permanent charges
which the Russian danger imposes on India, and the absolutely crushing