"الشرق الأوسط. الأنشطة التركية-البلشفية: مذكرة بقلم مسؤول الاستخبارات السياسية مرفقة إلى مكتب الهند." [و‎‎٨‎٦] (٨/٥)

i)
Its farther employment, therefore, may be obligatory for the Soviet Government. Our
intelligence points not to a reduction, but a constant increase in strength, which is
somewhat significant when we consider that Russia lids, as far as can be seen, nobody
to fight—since Wrangel has ceased to trouble her, an armistice has been signed with
Poland and peace concluded with Finland. The Russian Government cannot seriously
believe that England is threatening her in the East. Thus it is difficult to reconcile
her military activity and influx of German officers into Russia, her organisation in
Central Asia and the Caucasus, and her reinforcements to Persia, with the military
obligations necessitated by her present internal and external situation. Her army
therefore provides a political factor necessitating the fullest possible information
being obtained, and steps are being taken in this direction.
III. —Akmkma.
14. The elimination of Armenia has been prompted by five considerations :—
(a) to gain contact with the Nationalists; (6) to deny the country to the Anatolian
Government in exactly the same way as Bokhara was denied to Afghanistan ; (c) to
prevent by every possible means a junction of the Tartars and Turks. The Bolsheviks
fear this possibility extremely (such a combination, which is being worked for by the
C.U.P. and desired by the Tartars, would constitute a real danger : in consequence
they will never allow Armenia, Georgia or Azerbaijan to become Turkish); (d) to
create one more Soviet republic on the principle that has been enumerated above ;
(e) to create a corridor into Persia.
15. Throughout the negotiations between the Soviet Government and the Turkish
Nationalists this question has been considered as one of the most important. In the
telegram of instructions from Tchitcherin to Eliava already referred to, para. (2)
contains the following:—“ We will not conclude any agreements guaranteeing to the
Turks the oppression of minorities.” In the articles for the Turkish Nationalists’
acceptance communicated through Kaizim Karabekir we read “ (5) The movement
“ against the Erivan Republic must cease since this State is friendly to the Soviet
“ Republic, and Armenians in Turkey must not be ill-treated.”
16. On 14th August Mustafa Kemal made a speech in the Great National
Assembly defending his policy. He stated that Kaizim Karabekir on 4th June
submitted certain proposals, including one for measures to be taken against Armenia
to stop the massacres of Muhammadans. This particular proposal was accepted, and the
Western Army was ordered to prepare to advance. He continues :—“ Ten days after the
“ beginning of these preparations (i.e., 16th June) one of our delegates sent to Moscow,
“ . . . .as you all know, brought with him a letter from Mr. Tchitcherin. The letter
“ stated that the determination of the frontiers of Armenia, Persia, and Turkey
“ could be decided by the intervention of the Russian Soviet Government in a
“ diplomatic manner. A few days after we w'ere warned by an official letter that an
“ accredited Russian Mission was on its way from Kars by train. \\ e then ordered the
44 operations to be suspended after this Mission had met with our delegates at
Erzerum.
17. Finally, section 10 of the treaty as we have received it states :—“ The Soviet
“ Government will serve as intermediary in the Armenian-Persian-Turco frontier
“ question.” The original plan was a combined offensive against Georgia and
Armenia ; this fell through owing to the reverses on the Polish front necessitating
the withdrawal of the Soviet troops which had been concentrated in Azerbaijan.
The Russian Government, therefore, were not prepared to let the Turks invade
Armenia till they themselves were on the spot. Hence these orders above to cease
operations, which, it should be noted, the lurks obeyed. Meantime Russian efforts to
Bolshevise Armenia went on apace; the result is that Armenia is apparently at the
present moment a Soviet Republic associated with Moscow, and the lurks cannot now
over-run Armenia without definitely breaking with Moscow, and in direct opposition
to their treaty engagements, since Russia can now pose as Armenia’s protector.
IV.—The Anatolian Nationalists.
IS. Mustafa Kemal may be considered a “moderate”; his policy is directed to
securing a revision of the treaty of Sevres, including an assertion of the nominal
suzerainty of the Sultan over Arabia. The position of the Nationalists was at one
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