"مذكرة عن التجارة في الخليج الفارسي (قدمها مجلس التجارة)" [و‎‎٧‎٣] (٤/١)

CONFIDENTIAL.
Book
CO p w
Note on Trade in the Persian Gulf.
{Communicated by the Board of Trade.)
Sections (a) and (6) revised to 26th July 1928.
Section (c) to 30th June 1928.
(a) General.
When the Foreign Office Memorandum of 1908 was written, British preoccupations
in connection with the Persian Gulf mainly centred upon German competition and
the help which this would receive from the construction of the Bagdad Railway.
Russian designs, which had previously given rise to anxiety, had lost importance
through the destruction of the Russian fleets in the Russo-Japanese War. In the last
20 years the situation has undergone fundamental changes, but the threats to our
present well-established trade ascendancy in those regions still come from Germany
and Russia, though at present they are scarcely more than perceptible. At the same
time the establishment of economic autonomy in Persia and the abolition of the
capitulations certainly tend to impair British influence in that country and will
probably make it more difficult for Great Britain to resist favours which Persia seems
apt to show to both Germany and Russia, to the former largely because of her fear or
jealousy of Great Britain and to Russia because of the extent to which Persia is really
at the mercy of that country. On the other hand, the extinction of Turkish sovereignty
in all the regions of the Persian Gulf, and the ascendancy of British influence in Iraq,
together with oil developments in that country and Persia, would seem to do more
than counterbalance the changes in the other direction which have just been referred
to. In view of the change in the general position of Persia referred to above, it
would, it is thought, be misleading to treat the trade of the southern Persian ports
such as Bushire and Bunder Abbas separately from the general trade of Persia, though
it is true that that trade represents the main portion of British trade with Persia other
than the oil trade from Abadan and Mohammerah. ft may suffice to note here that
owing largely, of course, to the oil trade in question, the share of the total trade of
Persia which the British Empire participates in is now a good deal larger than it was
before the war. The following are the chief features from this point of view :—
Proportion of Persian Trade as divided between the Chief Participating Countries
{Exports and Imports).
1913-4.
1923-4.
Per cent.
Per cent.
British Empire (including India)
21
57
Russia -
60
18
Germany -
3
1
United States
1
4
Egypt
Tnrkpv 'i
4
4
( v
urkey )
■aq )
It may be added that for recent years the ports on the Persian Gulf have dealt
with about half the total trade of Persia, but here again oil accounts for the greater
portion of this trade, and the figures for Bushire and Lingah and Bunder Abbas alone
give a total of some 250,000,000 krans out of a total of 780,000,000. These figures
may be regarded as supplementary to those given in the Board of Trade Memorandum
of 30th dune, which gives the latest figures of Persian imports and also those for
imports into Iraq. In the latter case the British proportion of the trade, including
that with India, is well over 50 per cent., and in neither case has German or American
trade reached at all a large proportion, though it will be noted that in the case of
trade with Persia there has been a steady increase in the last three years, 1925-7, in
imports into Persia. Russia, it is well known, is making strong attempts to increase
her trade with Persia, which is, of course, not illegitimate having regard to her much
greater pre-war trade with that country, but it seems unlikely that she will be able to
oust British trade to any very serious extent. These are matters, of course, upon
3134a 50 10.28