ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الثاني "المحمرة: الوضع. نزاع الشيخ مع والي البصرة. تقليد الشيخ وساماً. تجديد التطمينات للشيخ". [و‎‎١‎١‎٥] (٥٦٦/٢٣٤)

was for him to keep his followers from causing disorders on Turkish territory,
and not to conceal or protect criminals,
Acting Vali to Mr. Crow, May 8. ^ escaped from Xurkey t0 Mohammerah,
but to hand them over to justice. He wanted nothing more.
This seems a reasonable attitude, and I told Haji Reiss so. He quite agreed
and said the Persians were ready to do that.
As reported in my telegram No. 24 of May 9th, the Vali emphasized his
desire to effect a reconciliation with the Sheikh, without the intervention of a
third party, meaning the Consulate. He also said he was willing to accept the
Shaikh’s sole assurances in regard to the preservation of order and the surrender
of criminals.
Ha'i Reiss then told the Acting Vali that the Sheikh would carry out
this undertaking as regards the future, and asked what the Turks required in
regard to pending questions.
1. The Menawee incident. Three persons, out of six asked for by the Turks,
were actually under arrest at Mohammerah and would be handed over, and they
were looking for the others.
2. The murder of Chelmeran. The Persians regretted his death as much as
the Turks, as he has been a friend of theirs and was useful to them, and, if the
murderer, who is known, was in Arabistan, he would be arrested by the Sheikh
and given up, or, if they ascertained that he was on Turkish territory, they would
inform the Vali of his whereabouts.
3. The case of Muhammad Chanan. For reasons already stated the
Sheikh could not surrender Chanan. The Acting Vali proposed, as a compromise,
that the Sheikh should remove him from Zein and not jet him return to Turkey
and appoint another agent in his place. Haji Reiss said that was all very well
now but the Turks ought to have made that proposal before bombarding the
Sheikh’s property. The Acting Vali admitted it would have been the better
course. Haji Reiss said he would induce the Sheikh to agree to this solution,
but he must consult him, and, in the meantime, the Acting Vali was to communi
cate the proposal to the Vali for his approval.
On May 8th Haji Reiss received private information that orders had reached
Shamil Pasha, the military commandant at Basrah, to arrest him, and that he
should at once return to Mohammerah as soldiers were already sent out to catch
him. I said l did not believe the Turks were capable of such a breach of faith,
but as a precaution, I would send a cavass with him when he went to the Acting
Vah, and I gave him a letter, copy enclosed, to hand to the latter. It was after
wards discovered that the information was merely given in order to frighten
Haji Reiss away, and so break up the negotiation, and that there was no founda
tion for it. Haji Reiss declined to give me the name of his informant but, as
he had been calling on that morning Seyyed Tahb, who arrived by the Russian
steamer “ Tigre ” on May 8th, I surmise the information must have come trom
him- . . u t 1
Haji Reiss was very anxious I should say something specific to the Turks
about the Sheikh’s assurances from the British Government. I told him I saw
no advantage in using such an argument, at all events at present, and I said 1
gave the Acting Vali clearly to understand, in my interview with him on May stn,
that His Majesty’s Government attached great importance to a settlement locally
and feared complications if it were not effected, as we had considerable interests
of a commercial nature in Arabistan. I added that the Turks were quite inte h-
gent enough to perceive that the Sheikh himself was one of those interests, and
that we were protecting him ipso facto by our intervention at the present juncture.
It seemed a pitv, I said, to use a big nail, which might split the plank, when a
tintack would do the work, Haji Reiss also consulted me as to what action the
Persians should take in regard to the two official communications addressed by
the Vali to the Persian Consul-General at Basrah on April 26ch, making direct
accusations against the Sheikh, and covertly threatening to attack Moham-
merah. I replied that my advice was to pigeonhole the letters and send no
answer at all. I feared any reply might lead to an acrimonious correspondence