ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الثاني "المحمرة: الوضع. نزاع الشيخ مع والي البصرة. تقليد الشيخ وساماً. تجديد التطمينات للشيخ". [و‎‎١‎١‎٨] (٥٦٦/٢٤٠)

of which I had not full knowledge, which I had in mind when I wrote the said
telegram to you, and my line of thought was that, even if they were proved to be
well founded, it could not be said that they had anything to do with the Wali’s
action in the present instance, which was a separate issue based on incidents
subsequent to the date of Basrah Despatch No. 14 of 10th March, which, so far
as could be seen from the reports of our officers, afforded no justification for
the Wali’s sudden change of attitude towards the Sheikh. In fact, the unjus
tifiability of the Wali’s proceedings, on the facts of which we were in possession,
was a necessary premise to my attitude, both in this telegram and in my letter
No. 569.
(tit) The expediency of effecting Nazif Bey's recall. —As to the degree of
difficulty involved to His Majesty's Embassy or Government in advising or
urging the Porte to change a particular Wali, I quite recognise that you had full
personal knowledge while I have none. I could only urge reasons which, from
a local standpoint, seemed to me to demonstrate the expediency of the course
advocated, both on the Sheikh’s account and in our own interests. On the
Sheikh’s account because, on the information before me, whether from Basrah
or Mohammerah, the aggression of the Wali seemed deliberate and uncalled for,
and because human nature being what it is, it was not conceivable to me that,
after what had happened, his relations with Nazif Bey could ever again be sincere
or satisfactory.
In our own interests because, apart from the general tendency with which
he credits most Turkish officials of the new regime, Mr. Crow had described
Nazif Bey as being personally impetuous, inexperienced as a Governor, and most
undiplomatic ; and also because, in the short time during which the latter held
office, he had displayed an attitude of mind actively and specifically opposed to
our interests and policy at the head of the Gulf, as the following instances will
demonstrate;—•
00 /Us regards Koweit and Mohammerah.—Roth publicly and privately
Nazif Bey has declined to admit any right on the part of our Consulate at
Basrah to discuss with him matters concerning either port, and he is reported to
have expressed publicly, on several occasions, his resentment at British inter
ference in Koweit affairs in the past, and his determination not to put up with it
in future. We further know from independent sources that he has been making
overtures to the Sheikh of Koweit in order to induce him to admit a Turkish
Telegraph Office in Koweit connected by a land-line with Basrah or Fao; and,
on another occasion, to allow Koweit subjects to be enlisted in the Hasa
gendarmerie.
(£) As regards Bahrein. —Although instructed from Constantinople not to
protest actively against our assertion of protective rights over the principality,
speaking for himself, Nazif Bey “ emphatically stated that he could not admit
that the British Government had any rights of supremacy over Bahrein ” [vide
enclosure to Embassy Despatch No. 6980, dated February 28th, 1910, to His
Majesty’s Foreign Office).
(c) As regards Baluchistan. —I have it from His Majesty’s Consul,
Mohammerah, that a few days after taking up his post, Nazif Bey issued a noti
fication in Basrah to the effect that Baluchistan, being an independent state, the
pretentions of Foreign Powers to protect Baluchis would under no circumstances
be recognised, and that they would be treated as Turkish subjects. Mr. Wilson
understands that this question is under reference to His Majesty’s Embassy.
It is true that a new Wali might have been equally aggressive, equally
inclined perhaps to pursue a policy opposed to our interests ; but I think the
probability rather is that he would have been less assertive, while it is hardly
possible that he could have been more so.
1 find it difficult to understand Mr. Crow’s view that the recall of the Wali
would endanger the security of the river. Sheikh Khazal has been entirely
amenable to our advice and guidance throughout his recent troubles with the
Wali, and but for that fact, the Wali’s action at Zain would certainly have been
followed by a rising of Arabs and consequent insecurity on the river. Had the