ملف رقم ٣٤٥ لسنة ١٩٠٨ الجزء الثاني "المحمرة: الوضع. نزاع الشيخ مع والي البصرة. تقليد الشيخ وساماً. تجديد التطمينات للشيخ". [و‎‎١‎٤‎٩] (٥٦٦/٣٠٢)

cause. It was from an analogous anxiety, and because I realised the weak
position in which Haji Rais found himself when he proceeded to Basrah, that I
was slow to take for granted that the onesided solution which he had provision
ally to accept at the hands of the Acting VVali would be acquiesced in by the
JSheikh.
Sheikh Khazal has now returned and had an opportunity of stating his^ own
case, and 1 can best leave Lieutenant Wilson’s record of it to speak for itself.
In any case, in the matter of detail, I can add nothing.
In regard to the incidents of recent occurrence, the Sheikh’s replies seem to
be satisfactory and to confirm the view that the Wall had no real justification for
his action. In regard to the events of past years, Sheikh Khazal lays no claim
to complete blamelessness, nor has it been claimed for him. As you are aware,
so far as his own territory is concerned, he has been a considerably more en
lightened ruler than his predecessors, and during the chaotic times of the last
few years his districts have been the most secure and best governed in Persia.
As ruler of a border province, and as an Arab landholder in lurkish territory, he
has always had a very difficult part to play vis a vis the Turkish authorities at
Basrah, and, left entirely to his own devices by the Central Government, has had
to protect his own interests and those of his tribesmen in the best way he could..
It has been in the main a matter of self-preservation, and I do not think^that the
description of the position given in paragraph ! 7 of Lieutenant Wilson’s letter,
is an overstatement of the straits to which he has at times been reduced, and for
which the rottenness of the provincial Turkish administration has been directly
responsible. 1 quite agree that, as the Porte, under the new regime reforms her
administration in the Basrah Vilayet, so must the Sheikh of Mohammerah
modernise his ideas of border relations, and I believe he will do so under our
friendly influence and guidance. On the other hand, hasty and aggressive
methods, such as those pursued by Wali Nazif Bey, (if in reality his action can
be looked upon merely as the vagary of an impetuous administrative official),
are only calculated to defeat their own object. But can the Wali’s proceedings
be considered in the above light at all ? The river generally was perfectly quiet
at the time of the Zain incident and had been for a long period before, and the
measures taken by Nazif Bey were not in the least necessary for the attainment
of his professed object, the maintenance of order in the Basrah Vilayet.
It seems much more probable that, except as a pretext, riverain affairs had
nothing to do with the Wali’s proceedings, and that the real motive for them is
rather to be sought in the fact, suggested by His Majesty’s Consul, Basrah, some
weeks before the present difficulty arose, that the Turkish authorities 1 would
not be sorry for an excuse to cause trouble to Persia weak and disorganised as
she is” ; a view to which the concluding sentence of telegram No. 71 from His
Majesty’s Ambassador at Constantinople to the Foreign Office affords some
corroboration.
The position is not difficult to understood. The Turks have been able _ to
encroach successfully on Persian territory on the Northern portion of the Frontier.
At the Southern end they have been powerless to do anything of the sort, firstly,
because the Sheikh of Mohammerah can manage the Arabs in his^ own territory,
and secondly, because, as an Arab, he has strong influence also with the lurkish
Arabs living near the frontier, from whom the lurks would consequently get
little sympathy or assistance.
Thus, from one side of the border we see that the power of the Sheikh of
Mohammerah and his ability to look after himself constitutes the only bulwark
on which Persia can reply to preserve her from Turkish encroachment on er
South-West Frontier; while from the other side we find that he (with the Sheikh
of Koweit indirectly) is the only obstacle to the furtherance of Turkish designs
or national policy in the same region. The Porte has thus a patent motive for
seeking to attenuate the Sheikh’s power and detach his Arab adherents from him,
and the simplest means of effecting that object is for them to make things un
pleasant for the Arab tribesmen living near the Frontier and endeavour to show
them, now that they (the Turks) have some force at their command, that the
Sheikh can no longer help them in their difficulties, as of old.