ملف رقم ٢١٨٢ لسنة ١٩١٣ الجزء ٩ "الجزيرة العربية - السياسة تجاه ابن سعود" [ظ‎‎١‎٢‎٠] (٤٠٦/٢٣٨)

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Tleiciz to £i line about 200 miles or moie east of Taif. I Ins brings up
question of Ataiba highlands extending another 100 miles east of Wadi
Naim • and as Sherif claims jurisdiction over Ataiba, the boundary of Nejd
falls back very nearly to the line Tuwaiq. I earnestly represent (1) that
matter is far more complicated than is supposed, and has two sides; (2) that
Bin Sand cannot abandon Khurma to its fate without raising widespread ^
disturbance of Nejd tribes . . . . ; and (3) that Khurma will never
submit to Sherifian attacks. ’’--[Transmitted in Baghdad telegram No. 7418,
dated 7th September 1918.]
4. Recent developments at Khurma may be briefly summarised. On the
26th November last Sir R. Wingate telegraphed that “ reports of aggressive
intentions ” on the part pi Bin Sand were reviving in the Hejaz; and that, according
to the local Sherifial military authorities, the “ Ikhwan ” at Khurma had been
reinforced by 450 mounted men. A few days later (Oairo telegram No. 1827,
6th December) King Husain reported that the Ikhwan had attacked and looted the
main supply base of the Hejaz force at Digadiah, about 45 miles north of Taif. The
King urged that this aggression, so close to his capital, would “precipitate a crisis,”
amAhat the situation could only be saved by an ultimatum from His Majesty’s
Government requiring all Ikhwan concentrations to disperse within 35 days. In a
subsequent report (Cairo telegram No. 1857, 10th December) King Husain stated that
an Ikhwan force under Sultan Bin Bijad, said to be Bin Sand’s principal agent with
the militant Wahabis, was “advancing towards Mecca.” Commenting on this news,
Sir R. Wingate remarked that there was “ no longer a doubt, after the Digadiah
“ affair, that the Ikhwan at Khurma have assumed the offensive, and constitute a
“ menace to the security of Mecca.” He recommended the “ immediate despatch by
“ His Majesty’s Government of peremptory instructions to Bin Sand to withdraw ail
“ militant Ikhwan from neighbourhood, making it clear to him that failure or delay
“ in compliance will entail reprisals (suspension of subsidy or closing of markets)
“ by His Majesty’s Government.” Later reports (Cairo telegram No. 1881,
14th December) indicate an advance by the Wahabis to a point within 20 miles of
Tail During the last three weeks no further news of hostilities has been received.
Action on the Hejaz side appears to have been delayed in consequence of the non
surrender of Medina by the Turks.
5. His Majesty’s Government decided on the 13th December “to warn Bin Sand
“ plainly that if he does not at once abandon and cause his followers to abandon all
“ aggressive action against Hejaz, and withdraw all militant Ikhwan now west of
“ Khurma, his subsidy will be stopped and we shall consider ourselves free to take
“ such further measures as we may deem desirable for maintenance of peace in
“ Central Asia.” It was suggested that this message might make more impression
if personally delivered by Colonel Wilson from Jeddah ; but the suggestion did not
commend itself to Sir R. Wingate and was accordingly dropped. Instructions to
forward the message from the Mesopotamian side were telegraphed to the Civil
Commissioner, Baghdad, on the 24th December. The latter replied on the 27th
December, proposing to send the message by the hand of Captain Bray, Political
Agent at Bahrein, but asking to be furnished, as material for the proposed ultimatum,
with “ somewhat more recent and, if possible, more reliable information than ex parte
“ allegations by King Husain, the veracity of whose previous reports as to Bin Sand
“ is not such as to inspire confidence.” It is not known whether Sir R. Wingate has
taken any steps to supply the further particulars desired. The Egyptian authorities
are inclined to regard the proposed message (which merely requires the withdrawal
of Ikhwan west of Khurma^as not going far enough; and Colonel Wilson (of Jeddah)
has expressed the view, which is shared by King Husain, that a “ conflagration ” is
unavoidable “ unless Ikhwan are withdrawn from Khurma and Bin Sand’s occupation
of that place through his Ikhwan ended ” (Cairo telegram No. 1927, 23rd December).
Mr. Philby, on the other hand, has urged that His Majesty’s Government should
intervene “ to prohibit Sherif from further aggression,” or should definitely recognise
Bin Sand’s “suzerainty over Khurma” (Baghdad telegram No. 10483, 29th
November).
6. On one point both Colonel Wilson and Mr. Philby are agreed, viz., that, failino-
intervention by His Majesty’s Government, an armed conflict is inevitable. The
question arises, if this view is accepted, whether we are bound to intervene, or
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