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ملف رقم ٢١٨٢ لسنة ١٩١٣ الجزء ٩ "الجزيرة العربية - السياسة تجاه ابن سعود" [و‎‎١‎٢‎١] (٤٠٦/٢٣٩)

هذه المادة جزء من

محتويات السجل: مادة واحدة (٢٠٣ ورقة). يعود تاريخه إلى ٢٧ ديسمبر ١٩١٨-٢ يونيو ١٩١٩. اللغة أو اللغات المستخدمة: الإنجليزية. النسخة الأصلية محفوظة في المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وثائق جُمعت بصفة شخصية. وسجلات من مكتب الهند إدارة الحكومة البريطانية التي كانت الحكومة في الهند ترفع إليها تقاريرها بين عامي ١٨٥٨ و١٩٤٧، حيث خلِفت مجلس إدارة شركة الهند الشرقية. .

نسخ

النسخ مستحدث آليًا ومن المرجّح أن يحتوي على أخطاء.

عرض تخطيط الصفحة

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whether events can be left to take their own course. Primct facie we are not
concerned with the internal feuds of Central Arabia, or with the sectarian contro
versies of Islam. Idle fact that both disputants are in close relations with ourselves
is not necessarily a decisive factor, for we are under no obligation to either party to
maintain his interests against Arab rivals. It is true that we could not tolerate a
^ Wahabi occupation of Mecca, which not only would be fatal to our prestige throughout
the East, but would lead to endless difficulties over the pilgrimage question. But the
War Office are already considering the question of rendering assistance to King
Husain for the defence of his capital. Their proposals include, not only the
despatch of Muhammadan troops, which seems clearly undesirable and is under
stood to have been dropped, but the more practicable suggestion of supplying
arms and war materiel. Moreover, so far as Mecca and the Ilejaz generally
are concerned, the case is sufficiently covered by the terms of the ultimatum
which His Majesty’s Government have already approved. The real question
seems to be whether the time has come to insist on a settlement that will definitely
assign Khurma to one party or the other, or' whether v e should leave the disputants
to light it out among themselves, putting our trust in (1) our warning to Bin Sand
against aggressive action west of Khurma, and (^2) Feisal’s undertaking to content
himself with expelling the Ikhwan from the Khurma region, as guarantees for the
localisation of the struggle. Against an immediate settlement it may be argued that
the advice of our local officers is so conflicting as to make it impossible for His
Majesty’s Government to form an equitable judgment on the merits of the case.
Sir B. Wingate warns us that King Husain would probably abdicate sooner than accept
even provisionally the assignment of Khurma to Bin Saud ; and Feisal has made it
quite plain to us that he will not tolerate Wahabi occupation of the district. On the
other hand, if Mr. Philby’s reports are accurate, the inhabitants of Khurma have
adopted Wahabi tenets and espoused Bin Sand’s cause of their own free will; and
their forcible reconversion or expulsion would be unpleasantly suggestive of religious
persecution. The objections to letting matters drift are obvious. Our policy is to
promote peace and goodwill, and not active hostilities, between our Arab friends.
The spectacle of civil war between our two leading proteges will not redound
to our credit or strengthen our claims to a “ mandate ” from the Peace
Conference for the supervision of Arabian affairs. There is always the risk
that the guarantees mentioned above will prove insufficient to localise the
struggle, and that either the Hejaz party may advance into regions of which we are
pledged by treaty to recognise Bin Saud as “ independent ruler” (Colonel Laurence,
I understand, regards this as very improbable, and indeed as impracticable), 01 that
Bin Saud, if successful at Khurma, may push his offensive into the Hejaz, where, for
reasons indicated above, his presence would be intolerable. It has to be borne in mmd
that active military intervention in the Hejaz or Central Arabia is not a practicable
proposition; for practical purposes, our means of exerting pressure, it diplomatic
methods fail, is by withholding our subsidy from the recalcitrant party and
furnishing his rival with assistance in the form of supplies, munitions of war, and so
forth.
7. The question is one that calls for an early decision by His Majesty s Govern
ment. On the whole the Department is disposed to recommend— ^
(J) that the ultimatum already approved (see paragraph 5) should lie conveyed
to Bin Saud by the hand of Captain Brayl wdthout more ado ;
(2) that the evacuation of Khurma itself by Bin Sand’s followers should not be
insisted upon;
/o\ that Kins Husain should not be asked to accept a provisional frontier (as
W sno-o-ested in Cairo telegram No. 1958, 27th December) definitely
assuming Khurma to Bin Sand’s sphere; it would seem sufficient to
communicate to him the substance of the ultimatum to Bin Saud and to
■ point out to him that the elimination of the Ikhwan from all regions west
of Khurma will secure the Hejaz completely against further aggressive
action He might be assured that we have no intention of prejudging
the question of the status of the district, and merely ask him to exercise
patience a little longer until the times are more propitious lor a final
settlement.
WTTkT E. Bray, M.U„ is an officer of the Indian Army, but he was formerly on special duty
in the Heinz and is known to the authorities in Egypt.
S 16 A2

حول هذه المادة

المحتوى

يتعلق الجزء ٩ بشكل رئيسي بالنزاع بين عبد العزيز بن عبد الرحمن بن فيصل آل سعود والملك حسين بن علي الهاشمي ملك الحجاز، والسياسة البريطانية تجاههما. تحتوي المادة على ما يلي:

المتراسلون الرئيسيون هم:

الشكل والحيّز
مادة واحدة (٢٠٣ ورقة)
لغة الكتابة
الإنجليزية بالأحرف اللاتينية
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ملف رقم ٢١٨٢ لسنة ١٩١٣ الجزء ٩ "الجزيرة العربية - السياسة تجاه ابن سعود" [و‎‎١‎٢‎١] (٤٠٦/٢٣٩)و المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهندو IOR/L/PS/10/390/1و مكتبة قطر الرقمية <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100036528095.0x00002f> [تم الوصول إليها في ٢٩ March ٢٠٢٤]

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