ملف رقم ٢١٨٢ لسنة ١٩١٣ الجزء ٩ "الجزيرة العربية - السياسة تجاه ابن سعود" [و‎‎١‎٤‎٣] (٤٠٦/٢٨٣)

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firstly, that the Ajman should be warned that, in the event of the
continuance of raids, their subsidies would be stopped and their
access to the local markets barred; and
Secondly that Ibn Sand should be given a free hand to deal with the
lube provided that the safety of the railway was not therebv
endangered. J
It was with a feeling of considerable relief that I communicated these
-orders to Ibn Saud. I was aware that he would not immediately be in a
position to take advantage of his newly won liberty in the matter, “while the
emoval of a substantial grievance was to be welcomed at a time when the
Sharifian situation threatened at any moment to become exceedingly delicate.
T ! 1 , e A i n l an Problem has caused Government a great deal of unnecessary
Tl a ? d d u e to a perhaps mistaken desire to be lenient to a
potentiany hostile element; but it is, m the light of experience, difficult to resist
the conclusion that much time, trouble and irritation might have been saved
by the acceptance without further ado of the ultimatum propounded by the
Mission so long ago as last December and its communication to the tribe.
1 Government had to return after ten months of futile search
or a better alternative, during which its desire to serve the interests of an
undeserving tribe resulted m the loss of much prestige in Central Arabia and
m increasing quite unnecessarily the number of counts, on which Ibn Saud
could indulge his querulousness with a f.air show of reason.
10. The Awazim Problem.
Inlike the Ajman problem the affair of the Awazim was of transitory
interest and presented no serious difficulty. The Awazim had long been recog
nised as one of the home tribes of the Kuwait jurisdiction and. in the old days
when the friendship of Mubarak and Ibn Saud rendered the delimitation of
i-S ±r01 ;r ers 01 Auwa it and INajd unnecessary, they were free to roam in
to Kuwait" alone t l6 PaStUreS ° n eitller side of t ' he frontie r while paying taxes
The unfortunate differences between Shaikh Salim and Ibn Saud how
ever, and especially the. protection accorded by the former to the rebel Ajman
old 5 rder of things, and Ibn Saud, by way of retaliation on
t e Shaikh of Kuwait for provocation offered, renewed and asserted in practice
ns long dormant claim to tax the Awazim graziers, whenever and wherever
they entered his territory m search of pastures or, in other words, annually,
because the narrow limits of Kuwait jurisdiction can never afford grazing suffi
cient for the needs of a Badawin tribe all the year through.
In enforcing this claim Ibn Saud was acting well within the rights con
ferred by sovereignty. At the same time he had no grudge against or desire
to press unduly on the Awazim tribe, which was placed for no fault of its own
m the unfortunate position of having to pay double taxes, and was perfectly
ready to consent to any reasonable arrangement or indeed to forego altogether
his right to tax the tribe—but on terms.
Tim settlement of the Ajman question by the effectual expulsion of the
tribe from Kuwait territory was an essential preliminary to any such arrange-
ment vmle, for the rest, Ibn Saud, after a discussion with the, Mission, under-
iook that, if Shaikh Salim wrote to him in suitable terms recalling the friendly
arrangement by which, in former times, the Awazim were exempted from the
payment of taxes to the Najd treasury and requesting a reversion to the old
policy, he would reciprocate by replying in similar terms and formally abjur
ing his claim to'tax the tribe thereafter. ■ ^ J
Qi .T^ e Q letters were, as a matter of fact, never exchanged and
Shaikh Salim xailed to reciprocate m the matter of the Ajman, while, on more
-han one occasion, elements of the_ Awazim tribe covered the movements of
Ajman and Shammar raiders on their excursions into Hasa. Nevertheless the
Awazim problem did solve itself—am,bulando—and it is to Ibn Sand’s credit
that he discontinued taxing the tribal flocks and herds without obtaining any
thing m the nature of a quid pro quo. & y
11. The Blochade.
Though our enemies in this War have undoubtedly enjoyed certain tacti
cal advantages over ourselves and our allies by reason of'their geographical
co esion, the fact that they are situated within a ring fence almost completely
surrounded by enemies has, in another direction, proved a serious disability,
m that they have been cut off from the markets of the world and have had to
rely on the goodwill of neutrals and the avarice of others to provide them with
an always precarious supply of necessary commodities, which they are unable
to produce m sufficient quantities in their own territories.
To make that supply more and more precarious and indeed to cut it off
altogether has therefore naturally been one of the most important military
objects of the allies, and the instrument used for the accomplishment of this
•end was the Blockade.