ملف رقم ٢١٨٢ لسنة ١٩١٣ الجزء ١٠ "الحدود الشمالية الغربية: البعثة الروسية المقترحة المختصة بعلم الحيوان" [و‎‎٢‎٩‎٤] (٦٦٤/١٧٩)

Sheri flans could spare neither commanders, troops, nor guns from the forces which were
besieging Medina, and further, that a big defeat at Khurma at that time would probably
r-ult m a disastrous reaction on the siege operations by heartening Fakhri Pasha and
enabling him to come to some arrangement with Ibn Saud for the further defence of
ye city or for surrendering it to the Ikhwan.
.. kittle was done, however, by India to call off Ibn Saud or to order him to cease his
anti-Shenfian propaganda amongst Hejaz tribes. The Indian view at that time was
that it would be wrong for us to support the King in military action against our treaty
Ally, ibn baud, and rt was not until March 1919 that a message was sent by His
Majesty s Government to Ibn Saud, “ advising him to modify" his attitude and to
persuade his followers from further opposition to the administrative measures of Kino-
Hussein at Khurma. *
The fall °f Medina, in January 1919, left Abdullah free to set out on his lono--
cherished expedition to Khurma, which, he had often prophesied, would be over with
the complete destruction of Ibn Sand’s forces, within two days of his (Abdullah’s)
arrival on the scene. y
... ™ feared b J British advisers on both sides (Iraq and Egypt) that Abdullah’s
dl-advised move must inevitably result in a collision of the rival forces, and it is quite
probable that had Abdullah remained in Medina the present crisis would not have
ansen. Indeed,^had we been aware of the Emir’s actual warlike intentions, we should
no doubt have strongly protested against the advance instead of merely sugo-estino- the .
impropriety of it. Abdullah’s regular force consisted of 60 officers, 770 other ranks 10
S f AhO ^ f? maCilr p e r ® ached Asheirah early in April. As soon as he learned
of Abdullah s move from Medina, Ibn Saud began counter preparations. He certainly
warned His Britannic Majesty’s Government of these, and, reasserting his wish for
arbitration, stated that he was compelled by pressure of public opinion to take measures
against aggression by the Shenfian troops. “ If the King and Abdullah will remain in
auJ u W w P a S ’ he said ’.“ Iwi11 remam in mine.” But although we looked upon
Abdullah s advance as unwise and foolhardy, and advised him not to start we do not
and cannot, deny his right to occupy Khurma.
E ie next mi litany incident was a raid by Ikwan (as reported by Abdullah) on
7 a l 1 ^ S 7 Begheihjah early in May 1919. The raiders were pursued by a detachment
o Abdullah s who failed to overtake them, but intercepted and defeated a second
iwan party, said to be en route to attack a Sherifian post at Madarmab. About the
same date, another detachment of Ikhwan was attacked at Kadheim by a patrol of
Abdullah, s and routed, whilst sleeping, by a hand-grenade bombardment. Of these
raids we have not yet received reports from Ibn Sand’s side.
On the 21st Abdullah reported that, after two and a half hours’ fighting he
occupied Tarabah and that after consolidating it, he would advance to Khurma In
that report Abdullah stands self-condemned. He had obviously scrapped his defensive
policy and doubtless decided to take the Ikhwan raid on Degheibjah as bis excuse for
an attack on Tarabah. .
Abdullah also reported the arrival in person of Ibn Saud at Sakphah (80 miles
north-east of Khurma). 1 v
,. be sure i^ I bn Saud does not deny that the Ikhwan raid on
Degheibjah ever took place, he will certainly assert that it was not done at his
instigation and was, therefore, an ordinary tribal raid for which he cannot be held
responsible.
Auu 1 °* tbe Ikhwan, under Emir Khalid, attacked
Abdullah at larabah, driving him out, and, according to several accounts, destroyed his
iegu ar force, capturing all its guns and machine guns. Emir Abdullah got away
with 500 Regular mountecl men only, and retired to Okheidir. Later information
>s mws that bherif Sharaf (Abdullah’s second in command) had a small force at Kelaikh,
v uc he Ikhwan attacked at dawn on the 26th May, but were repulsed, Sharaf
<i tei wards decided to join Abdullah at Okheidir. The retirement on this 1 latter place
was probably necessary to protect the Sherifial base at Asheirah.
ith the destruction of Abdullah’s army, the road from Khurma to Taif lies
open to the enemy.^ Mecca and even Jeddah are at the mercy of the fanatical
iwan. from Medina, Emir Ali can only send reinforcements of the same fio-htino-
value as Abdullah’s original force. ° &
Results.
j 5 ] a Sa< ^ ever y conflict with the Ikhwan, the Sherifian forces have'
‘een badly defeated. Abdullah’s regular army has failed the expectations of the British
L 2 u ~3] k> 2