مجموعة ٥/٧٣ "سلاح الجو الأفغاني: تقارير" [و‎‎١‎١‎٩] (٤٣١/٢٣٧)

1. General
REPORT OH THE AFGHAN AIH FQ3CE
FOR THE PERIOD 1st NOVE?ffiER,1942 - 31st JANUARY,
(a) The quarter under review has seen little activity on the part of
the Afghan Air Force. During November pilots were limited to 20
minutes flying practice per pilot per 14 days, but in December this
pC"^Lod was doubled, possibly because stocks of aviation petrol were
accumulating and storage capacity was limited. From 27th December
until January 31st weather conditions and the state of the Sherpur
airfield precluded any flying training being carried out. This year
the Sherpur airfield ms fit for use up to the 15th January, but after
that date tne snow became too deep for safe landing or taking off.
? (b) The absence of the permanent Commandant F.M. Mund Ihsan Khan
(V.W.363) has led to some deterioration in the administration of the
Air Force as the officiating Commandant, G.M. Muhd Hashim Khan («.W*339)
does not appear to be able to control his officers properly or nas he
sufficient influence in the Ministry of Defence or elsewnere in Qover-
Inment circles, to acnieve results or obtain decisions favourable to tne
development of the Air Force on reasonable l:'res. Muhd Hashim is a
poor administrator, but has succeeded during his spell as officiating
Commandant in securing some respect from his junior officers. On the
whole the British instructors consider that ti.ere has been a decrease
in efficiency during the quarter. This thty ascribe to a rise in the
cost of living, and a consequent desire on he: part of Air Force personnel
generally to do no more that the minimum amount of work.
In December a number of mechanics in the Ah" Force made a representation
to the Minister of Defence asking for more pay, and also that they be
given military rank similar to the pilots anl observers. They were
I informed that they were already adequately paid and it was unlikely that
they could earn more pay elsewhere. No further representations were
made, though a few of the mechanics remain dissatisfied with their condit
ions of service.
(c) F.M. Muhd Ihsan Khan the permanent Commandant who proceeded to India
for medical treatment in October, 1942, is xpected to return in February.
His absence has undoubtedly led to many delays in obtaining decisions
ion matters affecting the Air Force.
(d) The British instructors are vary concerned about the spares position,
and report that unless certain spare parts for Hind aircraft can be
obtained from India or elsewhere within the next few months, all the Hind
. aircraft will become unsafe for flying. They also consider that in the
( event of the Afgnan Air Force being ordered out on operations in support
of the Government and its land forces, it will be extremely difficult to
make more than 8 Hind aircraft available for tnis purpose. The R 0 meo
aircraft are unsuitable for operations in many parts of Afgnanistan as it
:j is known that they cannot take off from airfields having a high altitude
iwith a full war load.
(e) Details regarding stocks of aviation patrol believed to be held in
Kabul on 31st January sire given in paragraph 7.
(f) Appendix u a m to this report gives the number and condition of air
craft, and the number of trained or partly trained pilots in the Afghan
Air Force on 31st January, 1943.
(g) The Government of the united States of America are presenting a
Stearman Trainer aircraft to the Afghan Gov;rment.
A description of this aircraft is given in \ an graph 9 of this report