مجموعة ٥/٧٣ "سلاح الجو الأفغاني: تقارير" [و‎‎١‎٩‎٧] (٤٣١/٣٩٣)

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3148
1941 j
REPORT ON THE AFGHAN AIR FORCE '
Period 1st November, 1940 to 31st January, 1941.
1* GENERAL.
Appendix ’A* to this report gives the number and condition
of aircraft, and the number of trained or partly trained pilots
in the Afghan Air Force on 31st January, 1941.
The decision not to accept the British offer to train some
70 students in aviation in India is most disappointing,
particularly as the Commandant of the Air Force and the
Minister of Defence ha^ themselves asked for these facilities
in October, 1940.
Had we succeeded in dispatching tnis party to India it
would I consider (and Squadron-Leader Burt-Andrews agrees with
me) have eventually ousted Italian influence in the Afghan Air
Force, and left the British predominent in matters of supplies,
advice and training*
The excuse put forward by the Minister of Defence and the
Commandant of the Air Force for the cancellation of the
proposed training was that the Ministry of Education have
already provided a number of students for the Military College,
and were unable to supply further suitable students for training
in India. The reason given hardly holds water, since for some
time, 25 cadets have been undergoing preliminary training at
the sherpur aerodrome, were earmarked for dispatch to India
for training, and have only recently been informed that the
scheme has been abandoned.
There may have been other political reasons for the decision,
and it is possible that the Afghan Government do not at present
wish to offend Germany, Italy or Russia, and prefer to wait
until the international situation becomes more clear.
At interviews I had with the Commandant of the Air Force
and the; Chief of the General staff in January, I expressed
my disappointment cat the cancellation of the scheme and pointed
out that the Royal Air Force in India had gone to a lot of
trouble to work out plans for the training of tnis personnel,
only to find tin t their efforts had been wasted. Both these
officers expressed their r^gr^t for the inconvenience caused,
and the Commandant stated that he too was extremely sorry that
he had been compelled to abandoned the proposal, he hoped
however that the position would change during the next few
mouths and an acceptance of the offer become possible.
Whatever the real reasons fur turning down the offer of train
ing actually are, thc.ro is no d.ubt that the Commandant and
officers of the Air force are thoroughly convinced that
British methods of training are far superior to those of other
countries. British aircraft are hotter, and that the British
instructors supplied to the Afghan Air Force are most efficient
and largely responsible for any ability or technical skill
which the Forc^ may have at present.
These opinions are probably reinforced by events in Libya,
where the Italian Air Force has put up such a poor show and
undermined any local prestige the Italians may have had.
It is therefore strange that the Afghan Government should have
given way to probable.pressure on the part of tne Axis Powers,
and abandon the scheme for training their air personnel in India.