ملف ٣٥١٦\١٩١٤ الجزء ١٨ "الحرب الألمانية: بلاد فارس؛ الوضع العام - ١٩١٦" [و‎‎٦] (٣٦٨/٢٠)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government.]
PERSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA.
CONFIDENTIAL.
TFebruary 1.]
Section 1 ,
[ 19857 ]
No. 1.
Mr. Marline) to Sir Edward Grey. —(Received February 1, 1916.)
(No. 157.)
Sir, Tehran, December 5, 1915.
THE forecast which I made of Mustawfi-ul-Mamalek’s probable policy in my
despatch No. Ill of the 2nd September has unfortunately proved only too true. He
has been lavish in promises, but sparing of fulfilment, always alleging that to enable
him to take any step whatever running counter to public opinion— i.e., to German
interests—we must make some concession. Take, for instance, the dismissal of
Mukhbir-us-Sultaneh from the governorship of Ears, which is, as a matter of fact, the
only measure taken by the Government which can be described as anti-German, and is
typical of their attitude throughout Mustawfi’s tenure of office. At his formal
reception of the foreign representatives on the 20th August, the day after he assumed
office, the Prime Minister informed me spontaneously that he recognised the necessity
of recalling Mukhbir-us-Sultaneh, as the people of Ears were very discontented with
him, and the Government intended to replace him by a more suitable man at once. I
said that I was delighted to hear it, for, as his Highness well knew, we had been urging
the necessity of that step for a long time past. I could not, of course, avoid mentioning
the attack on the consulate at Bushire, but in doing so I purposely avoided saying that
among the demands which His Majesty’s Government would make for satisfaction of
the outrage would be the dismissal of Mukhbir-us-Sultaneh, so that Mustawfi could
truthfully say to his Democrat supporters that his dismissal was not a concession to us
in that connection.
When I next saw the Prime Minister, however, it was abundantly cleur that the
Democrat influences in Cabinet and Medjliss, and more particularly in the Government
offices, were not going to allow him to meet us half-way, and the dismissal of Mukhbir-
us-Sultaneh accordingly became the chief point in the settlement of the Bushire
outrage. You are aware from my telegrams of the unsatisfactory arrangement finally
reached, but, as the Government of India had decided against the use of force inland,
there was no other course open but to try conciliatory means and to feign belief in the
Government s good-will.
The history of the moratorium points to exactly the same conclusion. The Persian
Government put forward request after request which were one by one accorded by the
two Powers, but when the arrangement was finally put into the shape which they
described as essential in order to placate public opinion, no mention was made in the
Persian note of acceptance of the implied condition attached by us to the subvention.
On the contrary, the Minister for Foreign Affairs intimated that the Persian Govern
ment were then disposed to enter into a discussion of an entente with us, by which
Persia would in future adopt an attitude of benevolent neutrality in exchange for
various concessions from us, which he summarily indicated under six headings. In
fact, during this whole period from the 19th August, when the Mustawfi-ul-Mamalek
took office, to the 2nd November, when the Russian troops started from Kazvin
towards the capital, the policy imposed on the Cabinet by the Democrats and the
gendarmerie, the real force behind them and the backbone of German intrigue, was to
ask much and do nothing. So far as results are concerned, there was indeed little to
choose between the Mustawfi regime and the preceding six weeks, when there was no
Government at all. Mustawfi, himself, I believe, recognised the dangerous situation
towards which Persia was drifting, and would have liked to do something to arrest it ;
but he is terribly susceptible to what he calls public opinion, i.e., the opinion of the
Democrat by whom he is constantly surrounded, and the views of the German-paid
newspapers. He is also one of the least businesslike people in this unbusinesslike
country, and can waste, as I know by painful experience, any number of hours in futile
discussions, so that he allowed the whole work of the Ministry of the Interior (the
portfolio of which he held) to slip into the hands of the Secretary-General, one Mirza
Suleiman Khan, possibly the most active of the many pro-German Democrats with
which the public service swarms. Thus the instructions sent to the provinces at my
[2546 a—1] — B