ملف ٣٥١٦\١٩١٤ الجزء ١٨ "الحرب الألمانية: بلاد فارس؛ الوضع العام - ١٩١٦" [ظ‎‎٩] (٣٦٨/٢٧)

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kept m mind to enable a proper judgment to be formed of their difficulties in dealing;
with the agitation in the provinces.
. ^ refcurn ey ents in Tehran : on the 16th November M. de Etter and I were
invited to attend at the Derbar to assist at the reconstruction of the Cabinet. When
we reached the Palace the Ministers were discussing the question among themselves^
and from time to time one of them came to report progress or to ask whether such and
such an arrangement would be acceptable to us. But by degrees the more important
Ministers assembled in the reception-room, where we were waiting, and we took a direct
part m the conversation. The President said that the Ministers, including himself
unreservedly placed their portfolios at our disposal, and expressed the opinion that
Ain-ed-Dowleh should become Prime Minister, with Farman Farma as Minister of the
Intelior. It at once became clear that Ain-ed-Dowleh was the obstructionist, and
though I cannot say that my experience of him in May and June last was encouraging
I strongly urged him to accept office, because I felt that the prestige of his name
would give great weight in the provinces, if not in Tehran. His Highness, however,
flatly refused, and would give no reason for doing so. In these circumstances it
seemed to M. de Etter and me that the best combination was to retain Mustafi-el-
Mamelik as Premier and Farman Farma as Minister of the Interior. The latter would
unquestionably, by reason of his stronger character and greater energy, have been
more suitable to hold the reins of power at so critical a moment; but as against this
his Highness has been so identified with Bussian and British interests in the past six
months, and has incurred so much hatred on the part of the German Democrats and
pro-Germans, and is, moreover, no favourite with the Shah, that it is probable that he
would have been deserted by half the Ministers, and would have had to enter on the
. g. painful task of forming a new Cabinet. Mustafi, on the other hand, is
implicitly trusted by the Shah, and his continuance in office would further * be
acceptable and reassuring to all moderate public opinion. As Farman Farma himself
said, the circumstances were such that he could not even look over the wall, while
Mustafi could carry off the horse. It was still necessary to carry out the compact of
the day before that Ain-ed-Dowleh should take a seat in the Cabinet, but he modestly
declined all the more important portfolios and expressed a preference for the Ministry
of Commerce. Ain-ed-Dowleh as Minister of Commerce would have been farcical
and it was finally arranged that he should enter the Cabinet without portfolio, while
Farman Farma took over the Ministry of the Interior from Mustafi, who had previously
directed that Department. A few days later we succeeded in gettiim Akber Mirza
(Saram-ed-Dowleh), the Zil-es-Sultan’s son, appointed Under-Secretary to Farman
Farma—a very valuable arrangement.
The Shah, however, was still very nervous, his apprehensions being sedulously
kept alive by Colonel Edwall, who was constantly in attendance at the Palace
poisoning His Majesty’s mind with stories that the Bussian troops were advancing
from Keredj for the purpose of securing his person. His activity .as a German agent
was, however, by no means equalled by his courage, for, on a fantastic report that the
Armenians intended to throw a bomb into his house, the chief of the gendarmerie took
bast in the United States Legation for about a week—a comically undignified proceeding.
Colonel Edwall probably had some apprehensions as to his own fate in the event of^a
Bussian occupation of the capital, and I am told that for three or four days he found it
necessary to have constant recourse to the whisky bottle to steady his nerves. From
all I know of him, the story is probable enough. The conduct of this ex-officer of the
Swedish army, as well as that of Major Frick and Captain Poussette, showed perfectly
clearly that they were privy to and actively abetted the German endeavour to induce
the Shah to leave. Three days before the Bussian troops had reached Keredi they
were collecting transport, were openly assisting the Germans to send awav their arms
and ammunition, and connived at the departure of the Austrian prisoners of war whom
the Government had promised to intern; while when Farman Farma bad been
appointed Minister of the Interior, Colonel Edwall point-blank refused to obey his
orders. It was no fault of theirs, unless it was their lack of courage to create a little
disorder m the neighbourhood of the Palace, in which case I am confident the Shah
would have left, that the plot failed; but even by the 17th, though we had got round
the sharp corner, the road was by no means plain. The Shah was in constant need of
reassurance, and sent for M. de Etter that day. The Minister found His Majesty
almost as nervous as ever at the presence of the troops at Keredj, and I fancy that
M de fitter must have given a very positive pledge to obtain their withdrawal, for
when on his return to my house, where he was then staying, he found a telegram to
tne euect that the Grand Duke was opposed to taking that step,; he observed that, if