ملف ٣٥١٦\١٩١٤ الجزء ١٨ "الحرب الألمانية: بلاد فارس؛ الوضع العام - ١٩١٦" [و‎‎٢‎٣] (٣٦٨/٥٤)

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21
Telegram P., No. 19-F., dated the 9th (received 10th) January 1916.
From—His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Depart
ment, Delhi.
The Russians fought small and successful action January 7th against
gendarmes and Mujtahids at Assadabad.
They expect reach Kangavar on 10th instant.
22
Telegram It., No. 62, dated the 9th (received 10th) January 1916.
From—The Deputy Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Depart
ment, Delhi.
My immediately preceding telegram. Governor also received copy of wire
from Soulet dated Rasht, December 21st, addressed to Committee for Inde
pendent Persia in -which he admits that he swore to fight for “ nation ” when
called on, but so far not received call. Complains of newspaper aspersions
against honourable gentlemen and says that nation should call on him and
put him to test. He added that, if a force is necessary for Borasjun, Com
mittee should let him know so that he may send it at once.
Sent to Tehran ; repeated to Foreign and Basrah.
23
Telegram P., No. 20-F-, dated the 9th (received 10th) January 1916.
From—His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Depart
ment, Delhi.
(Sent to Foreign Office and Petrograd.)
Persian Government are preparing scheme for augmenting Cossack
brigade to 10,000 men. Colonel of Brigade has sufficient Persian officers
trained under him for this purpose. They would be paid for out of mora
torium and armed with rifles taken from gendarmerie.
This project is to be included among terms of a general agreement between
Persia and two Powers and Persian Government hope that provision will
be made under it to finance this force on permanent lines.
I have intimated to Persian Government that while His Majesty’s Govern
ment might in order to enable Persian Government to assist Russian troops
in dealing with existing situation agree to create such a force they would
scarcely relish its employment in South of Persia and would certainly never
adnit that after war only force in Persia should be under command of
Russian trained officers. They would certainly demand institution of any
force that might be required to maintain order in south where British interests
are so great should be similarly under British influence. Such an arrange
ment would lead to a definition of spheres of influence not far removed from
actual partition.
It is difficult in existing circumstances to object to increase of brigade
as it is only feasible means of providing Persian Government with a force
of any military value. Scheme has been prepared by Russian party and
Sipahadar, Sipahadar’s object being to embarrass Barman Parma who although
he sees difficulties to which it may lead does not wish openly to lay himself
open to attack by Russian party by opposing it. Russian Minister is disposed
to agree to scheme as a temporary measure though he understands that we could
not agree to operations outside Russian sphere of influence by the brigade.