ملف ٣٥١٦\١٩١٤ الجزء ١٨ "الحرب الألمانية: بلاد فارس؛ الوضع العام - ١٩١٦" [و‎‎١‎٤‎٩] (٣٦٨/٣١٠)

There is nothing to report to-day.
7
? 160
Telegram P. } No. f>08-F., dated the 4th (received 5th) December 1915.
From—His Britannic Majesty’s Minister, Tehran,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Depart
ment, Delhi.
(Addressed Foreign Office; repeated India, Petrograd)
Clear line. Of extent of General Nixon’s rererse I have not exact
knowledge, but it appears to have been far more serious than indicated in any
telegram I have received yet judgingfrom Viceroy’s telegram No. 118 yesterday.
If this is so chance of concluding an alliance with Persia is affected most
unfavourably. Baghdad being relieved and Nixon being in no position for the
present presumably to resume advance I submit it may be assumed enemy
will devote all his attention to his main objective that is forcing Persia into
war againt us. This will be best achieved by sending into Persia all troops
that can be spared from watching Nixon with practical certainty of rais
ing at least western provinces against Entente. Appearance of Turkish Army
reinforced by gendarmerie and by local levies already being collected will
fire Persia with hope of driving out Russians. This combined with promises
held out by Germans as stated in your telegram No. 427, will make it extiemely
hard for any Cabinet to join us except on terms of a most attractive nature.
We have in fact to outbid German terms so heavily as to outweigh dis
advantages of military position in w T hich in Persian eyes we shall be if and
when the Turkish force appears here.
How many Russian troops are now in Persia I do not know but accounts
have placed them at a far lower figure than we have been led to expect.
Russian Minister believes that Grand Duke intends to send altogether 40,000.
This w r ill be none too many in contingency I foresee.
Having twice put us off Prime Minister now promises to inform us on
Monday of- Persian requirements but I have learned direct that points being
considered by Cabinet are as follows:—
First. Cession of Persian territory embracing holy places including (Khadi-
main) ? Haramain, viz., Baghdad. Second. Cancellation of all Persia’s debts to
Great Britain and Russia Third. Two Powers to supply arms and ammuni
tion for 50,000 men. Fourth. Large monthly subvention during war. Fifth.
Abrogation of 1907 convention. Sixth. Stipulations of 1911 ultimatum to be
cancelled. Seventh. Large modifications of treaty (of) Turkomanchai. Eighth.
Lean of 8 million pounds to be arranged after wmr by international syndicate.
Ninth. Revision of tariff. Tenth. In Persia foreigners to possess real estate
on same conditions as exist in Turkey. Eleventh. Two Powers to guarantee
independence and integrity of Persia.
Of course I have wmrned Prime Minister against making exhorbitant terms
such as point 1, but I have no great confidence that he will be strong enough
to stand firm against pertinacious pro-German party in Cabinet, possibly
whole list may be presented to us.
If my appreciation of Nixon’s position and its consequences is approxi
mately correct immediate acceptance of Persian terms it appears to me affords
only hope of securing alliance, but even so, considering opportunity there
will be for pro-Germans to prolong negotiations chance is not rosy.
A regards point two (one ?) I would remark that when Nixon is again
able to advance Bakhtiari (interest in ?) holy places w'ould secure us the support
of any number of tribesmen.
On the other hand his communications along Tigris with Frontier
tribesmen ( ? actively) hostile would be very seriously hampered to say least
of it.
164
Telegram P., dated (and received) the 5th December 1915.
From—His Britannic Majesty’s Consul, Kerman,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political
Department, Delhi.