مجموعة ٤٥/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. مفاوضات حول إبرام معاهدة أنجلو-فارسية؛ إلغاء المعاهدات الحالية." [ظ‎‎٥‎٦] (١٥٤/١١٢)

February 13th is convincing enough. In it he as]:s
in return for convincing reasons in favour of the
view hitherto expressed by His Majesty’s Government,
but it must be confessed that the draft reply now
communicated by the Foreign Office is not very
convincing. However, it does not seem necessary to
take exception to its general terms, for obviously
there can be no objection , from the India Office
point of view, to sticking to our guns vis-a-vis the
all
Persians in this matter, and where/the issues are so
theoretical there is perhaps no harm in accepting
without question the fruit of the combined wisdom
of the Treaty and Eastern Departments.
The only practical point in which it
seems desirable to take an interest is the wording
of paragraph 7 of the draft, though even this point
is not vastly important.
It is common ground that the Commercial
Treaty of 1841 would really be of very little use if
it came to a question of trying to irast on the
retention of the Residency at Bushire in the face of
blank Persian resistance. From this the Foreign
u ffice in their draft (encroaching in their usual
manner from common ground into debatable ground with
an appearance of innocence) go on to say that the
question whether the 1841 Treaty need be mentioned
or not in the abrogation article can be left to the
Persian Government. It is however a different thing
(a) to know that one cannot rely on a treaty provision
and (b) formally to abrogate that treaty, thus implying
that (in this instance) it is actually the intention
to evacuate the Residency in any case. The question
i
of