مجموعة ٦ / ٦٧ (٦) "حدود جنوب شرق الجزيرة العربية وقطر: امتيازات النفط في الساحل المتصالح" [و‎‎١‎٨‎٣] (٤٠٢/٣٧٢)

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tions^from His MaYest^rGovemmenrslrAZreTE, 1101 ? u f eSsf ^ 1 17 0n instruc ’
matter again before he left for Europe about a monih later Sheikh Yusuf YaJin
Ibn Saud s private secretary (who acted for him in his absence) Droved to £
even more evasive, and eventuallv he informpri A T a P r ® ved to be
said, consultation with Ibn Saud, that they did nofhsh to toh&fr f ! 6
conversation with Fuad Bey about the agreement with Qatar Sir Andrew Rvan
as^^iirrss!* w* s •ssJft
Laviiroverboard To Saud threw Fuad Bey and the alleged agreement
s AvA - ftftAtasr s d ss
the exfstenc^of ^the jireYOl^agre^menl! 1 ^ end ° rSe hiS sta “'about
• fl 29 ' ^t thls interview Sheikh Yusuf Yasin said that Ibn Saud had not
m the past recognised any specific limits to the territories of the Persian Gulf
rulers, though he always treated them in a liberal spirit. When the Ikhwan
system was being organised he had directed the Ikhwan not to go into the Jebel
Dukhan or the ^raiq (see paragraphs 40-41 below) in order that they should
not incommode the Sheikh of Qatar. The conversation turned to the letter which
Ibn Saud had written to the Sheikh of Qatar about the oil concession, and Sheikh
lusut Yasin s attitude compelled Sir Andrew Ryan to repeat the warning that
u the threat contained in Ibn Sand’s letter were carried out, His Maiesty’s
Government would be bound to protect what they believed to be the territory of
the Sheikh of Qatar. Sir Andrew Ryan also made His YUajesty’s Government’s
attitude on the question of direct correspondence quite clear. The Saudi Arabian
Government might think, contrary to the British view, that they were free to
address the Sheikh of Qatar direct, but if the Sheikh received any communication
from the Saudi Government, he was not merely free, but under an obligation, to
inform His Majesty’s Government.
30. In October 1936 Petroleum Concessions, Limited, a subsidiary of the
Iraq Petroleum Company, informed the Foreign Office that the Ruba-al-Khali
probably contained important oil resources, and that they would like to obtain
from Ibn Saud a concession covering all the territory under his sovereignty east
of meridian 48° up to such a boundary as might eventually be agreed upon
between him and His Majesty’s Government. The Foreign Office pointed out
that such an application might give Ibn Saud an exaggerated idea of the economic
value of the area in dispute and make him even more intransigent in his dealings
with His Majesty’s Government, and expressed the wish that the company should
not approach Ibn Saud until the frontier negotiations had made some progress
and, at any rate, not for another six months.
31. The frontier question was taken up with Fuad Bey later in the year,
and on his return from a visit to Ibn Saud he expressed the following views to
Sir Reader Bullard, who had by that time succeeded Sir A. Ryan: Any
impression Sir A. Ryan might have had that the Saudi Arabian Government
were prepared to compromise was due to a misunderstanding of his (Fuad Bey’s)
ideas, which were that he should try to find some middle course to recommend to
their Governments. He had no counter-proposals to make to the latest offer of
His Majesty’s Government, since the southern boundary proposed by the Saudi
Arabian Government was based on the essential needs of the tribes in that area.
The British suggestion that the line along longitude 55° East might be moved
eastwards was not of much interest to the Saudi Arabian Government, since the
country in that region was desert. Fuad Bey appeared to be taking advantage
of the change of Ministers when he suggested that His Majesty’s Government
attached the greatest importance to the Khor-el-Odeid, but much less to the Jebel
Nakhsh, which the Saudi Arabian Government regarded as most important.
Sir R. Bullard held out no hope of any concession beyond that already mentioned,
and could only promise to report to the Foreign Office.
32. Sir R. Bullard informed the Foreign Office that but for the complica
tion introduced by the interests of Petroleum Concessions, Limited, in Qatar he
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